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FHA Sexual Harassment Claims: Title VII Applications 
and Departures through Case Law and HUD’s 2016 Rule 
I. Introduction
Sexual harassment in the housing context gained public and legal 
attention following the rise in awareness surrounding sexual harassment at 
work. Accordingly, as courts grappled with sexual harassment claims 
brought under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA), they imported 
standards developed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
prohibited sex-based discrimination—including sexual harassment—in 
the workplace. But while some elements of Title VII case law may apply 
in the housing setting, others do not. This Note considers the fit of Title 
VII standards imposed on FHA sexual harassment claims by analyzing 
FHA case law and the 2016 rule issued by the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD), which defines sexual harassment under the 
FHA. 
First, this Note traces the development of Title VII sexual harassment 
law and the adoption of the framework and standards developed for Title 
VII into FHA case law. Next, it addresses scholarly arguments on the 
differences between claims brought under the FHA versus Title VII and 
the need for legal standards tailored to the housing setting. These 
arguments focus on the heightened privacy rights in and sanctity of the 
home, unique features of the landlord-tenant relationship, and particular 
vulnerabilities common to victims of sexual harassment in housing. This 
Note then discusses decisions that considered the unique context of 
housing before HUD’s 2016 rule and how these differed from case law 
relying wholly on Title VII standards. 
Next, this Note analyzes 24 CFR § 100.600, issued by HUD in 2016. 
This rule utilizes the Title VII framework for evaluating sexual harassment 
claims but also considers the unique setting of housing in FHA claims. 
While this rule may not go far enough in emphasizing differences between 
harassment at home versus at work, it provides space for courts to consider 
these differences when adjudicating claims brought under the FHA. 
Finally, this Note analyzes FHA sexual harassment cases decided 
since HUD’s 2016 rule to assess how courts are applying this rule. Courts 
are underutilizing and sometimes outright contradicting 24 CFR 
§ 100.600. Consequently, courts continue to be divided over how closely
FHA cases should follow Title VII precedent, and some courts continue to
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apply ill-fitting standards to FHA sexual harassment claims. Courts should 
provide more deference to HUD’s rule. Courts should also explicitly and 
uniformly acknowledge the unique nature of sexual harassment in the 
housing setting. Until courts account for the differences between 
harassment at home and harassment at work, standards designed under 
Title VII will continue to inappropriately constrain relief under the FHA. 
II. The Title VII Standard
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it illegal “for an 
employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because 
of . . . sex” or other protected characteristics.1 In 1980, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued guidelines that 
included sexual harassment within the scope of discrimination prohibited 
under Title VII.2 The Supreme Court addressed the issue in 1986, finding 
in Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson that sexual harassment is a form 
of sex-based discrimination.3 The Court recognized two types of sexual 
harassment: “quid pro quo” harassment, whereby a perpetrator conditions 
employment benefits on sexual favors, and “hostile environment” 
harassment, which does not involve loss of a tangible job benefit but 
creates an offensive work environment.4 
In Meritor, the Court held that for a hostile environment claim to be 
actionable, the offending behavior must be both “unwelcome”5 and 
“sufficiently severe or pervasive [as] ‘to alter the conditions of [the 
victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’”6 
Subsequently, some courts interpreted this standard as prohibiting only the 
grossest behavior such as actions causing serious mental harm.7 The Court 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2020). 
2. Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
3. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73.
4. Rebecca Hanner White, Title VII and the #MeToo Movement, 68 EMORY L.J. 1014, 1017 
(2018); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 73. The Court made its decision by referencing the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit, which previously recognized the hostile work environment claim. 
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 62 (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). The D.C. Circuit 
relied on a definition of the two types of claims in the EEOC’s 1985 Guidelines on Discrimination 
Because of Sex. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)). 
5. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
6. Id. at 67 (citing Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)) (second alteration
in original). 
7. See, e.g., Snell v. Suffolk Cty., 782 F.2d 1094, 1102–03 (2d Cir. 1986) (“The Fifth Circuit
put it succinctly, ‘a discriminatory and offensive work environment so heavily polluted with 
discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group 
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clarified in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. that the behavior need not cause 
psychological injury to the victim to satisfy this threshold.8 
To meet the “severe or pervasive” standard, offensive conduct must 
be both subjectively perceived by the victim as hostile and objectively 
identifiable as such.9 For the objective prong, courts utilize the perspective 
of “a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position,” considering the totality 
of the circumstances.10 Some courts have criticized the reasonable person 
standard, stating that “a sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be 
male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the experiences of 
women.”11 One proposed reform is the adoption of a “reasonable woman” 
standard (for cases involving women victims) to better consider the 
perspectives of women in determining offensiveness,12 but only one circuit 
court has adopted this standard.13 
workers’ may constitute a violation of Title VII.”); Eric Schnapper, Some of Them Still Don’t Get It: 
Hostile Work Environment Litigation in the Lower Courts, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277, 278 (1999) 
(“the Sixth Circuit decision in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co . . . limited sexual harassment claims—
the very claims declared actionable by Meritor—to cases where the harassment had caused (or nearly 
caused) a nervous breakdown. The Rabidue restriction was clearly inconsistent with Meritor’s 
insistence that Title VII reaches ‘the entire spectrum’ of discriminatory treatment.”) (internal citations 
omitted); White, supra note 4, at 1017–18. 
8. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993). 
9. Id. at 21.
10. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (citing Harris, 510
U.S. at 23). The totality of the circumstances test was introduced by the EEOC in 1980: “In 
determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the Commission will look at the 
record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances 
and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred.” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1985) (cited in 
Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986)). The Eleventh Circuit was the first to 
cite this test. Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). 
11. Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393, 1397–98 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Ellison v. Brady,
924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991)) (“Notably, women remain disproportionately vulnerable to rape 
and sexual assault, which can and often does shape women’s interpretations of words or behavior of a 
sexual nature, particularly if unsolicited or occurring in an inappropriate context.”). 
12. Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1459 (1984) (“The proper perspective is the objective one of the reasonable 
victim. Such a standard would protect women from the offensive behavior that results from the 
divergence of male and female perceptions of appropriate conduct . . . . By adopting the woman’s 
point of view as the norm, the courts might heighten male sensitivity to the effects of sexually offensive 
conduct in the workplace.”). 
13. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879. See Beliveau, 873 F. Supp. at 1397–98 (“The goal is a level
playing field[,] and a gender-conscious examination of sexual harassment enables women to 
participate in the workplace on an equal footing with men. . . . By acknowledging and not trivializing 
the effects of sexual harassment on reasonable women, courts can work towards ensuring that neither 
men nor women will have to run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed 
to work and make a living.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ellison, 924 
F.2d at 879). 
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The totality of the circumstances test “may include the frequency of 
the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically 
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it 
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”14 In 
determining whether actions are sufficiently severe or pervasive, courts 
look for behavior that is recurring.15 Rarely, a court will consider a single 
incident sufficient if it is especially severe, but isolated incidents are not 
typically sufficient.16 
Under this standard, it is difficult for plaintiffs to succeed on hostile 
work environment claims. Courts have been quick to emphasize that Title 
VII is not “a general civility code.”17 For instance, verbal harassment 
alone—even if highly offensive—typically does not qualify because 
“mere offensive utterance[s]” are not deemed sufficiently severe.18 Even 
when behavior does meet the steep severe or pervasive standard, 
employers are often still protected from liability. The Supreme Court has 
recognized an affirmative defense—the Faragher-Ellerth defense19—that 
absolves an employer of liability for the harassing actions of an employee 
if the court finds that (1) the employer exercised reasonable care in 
preventing and correcting harassment, and (2) the victim “unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities 
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”20 
Scholars have criticized Title VII case law as being too permissive of 
sexual harassment in the workplace.21 Cases where serious misbehavior 
goes unpunished support the claim that some judicial interpretations of the 
severe or pervasive standard have set the bar for recovery too high.22 For 
example, in Metzger v. City of Leawood, a police chief’s former employee 
14. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
15. Schnapper, supra note 7, at 320–32.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81 (“The prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex
requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the workplace; it forbids only behavior so objectively 
offensive as to alter the ‘conditions’ of the victim’s employment.”). 
18. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786–88 (1998) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. 
at 23). 
19. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775; Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 542 U.S. 742 (1998). 
20. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 778.
21. See, e.g., Shauna K. Candia, The Hostile Work Environment: Are Federal Remedies
Hostile, Too?, 13 U. HAW. L. REV. 537 (1991); Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the 
MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV. 229, 245 (2018); Karen Fleming-Ginn, Hostile Work 
Environment Cases (Employment Law), 16 JURY EXPERT 6 (2004); White, supra note 4, at 1015. 
22. See Sara L. Johnson, When is work environment intimidating, hostile, or offensive, so as
to constitute sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.), 78 A.L.R. Fed. 252 (1986). 
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alleged “15 to 18 incidents of unwanted touching . . . three offers for an 
affair, one inappropriate comment about her bra, [and] an unfriendly 
atmosphere at work” due to rumors that she was having an affair with the 
chief, but the court found this conduct insufficiently severe or pervasive 
to grant her relief.23 Until 2019, the Seventh Circuit described its extreme 
position this way: “[t]he workplace that is actionable is the one that is 
‘hellish.’”24 Such judicial interpretations weaken Title VII and deprive 
victims of harassment of its protection. 
Scholars have also criticized courts for permitting an “equal-
opportunity harasser” to escape liability.25 The Supreme Court’s statement 
that offensive behavior is not actionable unless “members of one sex are 
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which 
members of the other sex are not exposed”26 has shielded those who harass 
both men and women. This class-based standard has been recently 
discarded in Bostock v. Clayton County, when the Supreme Court 
indicated that sexual harassment analysis should be applied to individuals 
rather than to women or men as a class.27 The Court recognized 
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity as sex-based 
discrimination under Title VII and stated that Title VII applies in 
circumstances where, for example, a person harasses both a man who is 
gay and a woman; this removes the unsound safeguard for equal-
opportunity harassment.28 
23. Metzger v. City of Leawood, 144 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1250 (D. Kan. 2001), described in
Johnson, supra note 22. 
24. Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Baskerville v. 
Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995)). But see Gates v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 916 F.3d 
631, 632 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that the “hellish” standard is not one a plaintiff must satisfy). While 
this change is positive, this standard applied within the Seventh Circuit for two decades. 
25. See, e.g., Shylah Miles, Note, Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Defense: Eliminating the 
Equal-Opportunity-Harasser Defense, 76 WASH. L. REV. 603, 603 (2001). 
26. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (quoting Harris, 510
U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)); see also White, supra note 4; Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 
F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982) (“The essence of a disparate treatment claim under Title VII is that an
employee or applicant is intentionally singled out for adverse treatment on the basis of a prohibited
criterion.”). 
27. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1740–41.
28. Id. at 1741, 1754 (2020) (“Nor is it a defense for an employer to say it discriminates against
both men and women because of sex. This statute works to protect individuals of both sexes from 
discrimination, and does so equally. So an employer who fires a woman, Hannah, because she is 
insufficiently feminine and also fires a man, Bob, for being insufficiently masculine may treat men 
and women as groups more or less equally. But in both cases the employer fires an individual in part 
because of sex. Instead of avoiding Title VII exposure, this employer doubles it.”). 
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Scholars further argue that the Faragher-Ellerth defense has created 
“a virtual safe harbor that protects employers,”29 insulating them from 
liability. Research indicates that “75% of workplace sexual harassment 
victims experience[] retaliation after speaking up.”30 Therefore, 
demanding that victims report the harassment does not seem reasonable. 
Additionally, many companies’ anti-harassment policies have been proven 
ineffective,31 further weakening the justification for the defense. Yet, the 
defense is used to insulate employers from liability with the result that 
employers are frequently granted summary judgment and relief is barred.32 
Ultimately, Title VII case law offers inadequate protection to victims 
and potential victims of sexual harassment at work.33 When its standards 
are imposed on the housing context, these failings are exacerbated. 
III. Court Decisions Importing Title VII Case Law into FHA
Claims 
Sexual harassment in the housing setting has received less attention 
than sexual harassment in the workplace, both publicly and in the courts. 
29. Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite Is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment,
61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 675 (2000). 
30. Robyn South, What HR Is Still Facing Two Years into #MeToo, TLNT (Feb. 13, 2019), 
https://www.tlnt.com/what-hr-is-still-facing-two-years-into-metoo/. 
31. See, e.g., JoAnna Suriani, Reasonable Care to Prevent and Correct: Examining the Role 
of Training in Workplace Harassment Law, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 801, 817 (2018); 
Lauren B. Edelman, How HR and Judges Made It Almost Impossible for Victims of Sexual Harassment to 
Win in Court, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (Aug. 22, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/08/how-hr-and-
judges-made-it-almost-impossible-for-victims-of-sexual-harassment-to-win-in-court. 
32. Suriani, supra note 31, at 810.
33. Some scholars have expressed hope that the revelation of the prevalence of workplace 
sexual harassment through the MeToo movement will lead courts to realize that this standard does not 
adequately protect against or punish sexual harassment. See, e.g., Tippett, supra note 21; White, supra 
note 4, at 1015 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)); Joan C. 
Williams, et al., What’s Reasonable Now? Sexual Harassment Law After the Norm Cascade, 2019 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 139, 224 (2019); L. Camille Hebert, Is MeToo Only a Social Movement Or a Legal 
Movement Too?, 22 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 321, 330–331 (2018) (“The ‘MeToo’ movement has 
the potential to change the ways that courts view the seriousness of sexually harassing conduct. When 
women come forward years and even decades later to report the sexually harassing conduct to which 
they have been subjected, courts might start to understand that the harassing conduct to which the 
women were subjected was not ‘trivial’ conduct quickly forgotten, but serious conduct with long-
ranging effects on those subjected to it . . . Women may be able to demonstrate to courts that they 
subjectively perceived the harassing behavior as harmful and abusive, not merely annoying, when they 
can detail the effects that the conduct had on their lives. And the similar reactions to similar conduct 
by other women who have been encouraged to come forward by the ‘MeToo’ movement may 
demonstrate the objective reasonableness of those reactions. It might be difficult, or at least unseemly, 
for courts to assume that a large group of women with similar reactions to sexually harassing behavior 
are all objectively unreasonable.”). 
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Similar to—and perhaps to a higher degree than—harassment at work, 
harassment in housing suffers from widespread underreporting.34 While 
victims of harassment at work are largely aware that offensive conduct is 
illegal and can be reported, victims of harassment at home are largely 
unaware of the illegality or reportability of the conduct.35 In 2017, the 
Housing and Civil Enforcement Section of the Department of Justice Civil 
Rights Division launched an initiative aimed at combatting sexual 
harassment in housing.36 This initiative includes a public awareness 
campaign that, with the partnership of HUD, is aimed at educating the 
public about what illegal sexual harassment entails and how it can be 
reported.37 Hopefully this effort will increase reporting and public 
awareness surrounding the problem of sexual harassment in housing. 
Still, the relative obscurity of this issue has impacted its legal 
development. As this issue trailed that of harassment at work, courts 
largely turned to Title VII standards to adjudicate the novel issue of sexual 
harassment under the FHA. To date, the Supreme Court has not addressed 
sexual harassment under the FHA, and federal decisions on the topic are 
relatively sparse.38 
The Title VII standard was first applied to sexual harassment in 
housing in Shellhammer v. Lewallen in 1985.39 There, a married couple 
alleged that their landlord requested nude photos and sex from Mrs. 
Shellhammer and evicted the couple after her refusal.40 The Sixth Circuit 
noted that the magistrate applied Title VII standards due to the lack of 
precedent under the FHA.41 The magistrate found sufficient similarities 
between Title VII and the FHA to justify transposing Title VII standards 
into the housing context, ruling both quid pro quo and hostile environment 
34. E.g., Beverly Balos, A Man’s Home Is His Castle: How the Law Shelters Domestic
Violence and Sexual Harassment, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 77, 78 (2004). 
35. See Kate Sablosky Elengold, Structural Subjugation: Theorizing Racialized Sexual
Harassment in Housing, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 227, 248 (2016). 
36. Press Release 17-1093, DOJ, Justice Department Announces Initiative to Combat Sexual
Harassment in Housing (Oct. 3, 2017). 
37. Press Release 18-960, DOJ, Justice Department Launches Public Awareness Campaign
with Victims of Sexual Harassment in Housing (July 23, 2018). 
38. See Elengold, supra note 35 (“After weeding out the cases that did not involve allegations
of sexual harassment in housing, I was left with one hundred and two opinions” for both state and 
federal claims). 
39. Shellhammer v. Lewallen, No. 84-3573, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 14205 (6th Cir. July 31, 
1985). 
40. Id. at *1–2.
41. Id. at *3–4; Rigel C. Oliveri, Sexual Harassment of Low-Income Women in Housing: Pilot 
Study Results, 83 MO. L. REV. 597, 604 (2018). 
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claims actionable under the FHA.42 The Sixth Circuit upheld the 
magistrate’s decision, which applied Title VII’s “sufficiently severe or 
pervasive” standard to the Shellhammers’ hostile environment claim and 
indicated that the landlord’s two requests for sexual acts failed to meet that 
standard.43 On the quid pro quo claim, the Sixth Circuit noted the 
magistrate’s conclusion that the Shellhammers successfully proved that 
their eviction was based on Mrs. Shellhammer’s refusal to engage in 
sexual acts.44 The Sixth Circuit did not discuss any differences between 
harassment at home versus at work. 
Soon after Shellhammer, scholars began identifying unique 
circumstances and harm of harassment in housing, calling into question 
the suitability of Title VII’s case law for housing claims. In the first 
significant law review article addressing harassment in housing, Regina 
Cahan stated that harassment at home “may be even more traumatic” than 
harassment at work.45 This is because “at work, at that moment or at the 
end of the workday, the woman may remove herself from the offensive 
environment.”46 However, “when the harassment occurs in a woman’s 
home, it is a complete invasion in her life. Ideally, home is the haven from 
the troubles of the day. When home is not a safe place, a woman may feel 
distressed and, often, immobile.”47 Accordingly, the differences between 
the two settings may render harassment at home more severe than 
harassment at work.48 
While the unique attributes of harassment under the FHA may have 
justified creating a new standard for sexual harassment in that context, 
other courts followed the Sixth Circuit’s lead, utilizing Title VII case law 
to develop rules for FHA claims.49 In Honce v. Vigil, for instance, the 
42. Oliveri, supra note 41.
43. Shellhammer, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 14205, at *4.
44. Id. at *4–5.
45. Regina Cahan, Comment, Home is No Haven: An Analysis of Sexual Harassment in
Housing, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 1061, 1073 (1987). 
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See infra Part IV.
49. Robert G. Schwemm & Rigel C. Oliveri, A New Look at Sexual Harassment Under the
Fair Housing Act: The Forgotten Role of § 3604(c), 2002 WIS. L. REV. 771, 782 nn.63–65 (2002) 
(citing numerous cases agreeing with Shellhammer). “Also, to the extent that subsequent cases cited a 
specific provision within the FHA that was violated by sexual harassment, they, like Shellhammer, 
generally relied on § 3604(b)’s prohibition of discriminatory ‘terms and conditions.’ None ever 
mentioned § 3604(c)’s ban on discriminatory statements as a basis for a harasser’s possible liability 
under the FHA.” Id. 
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Tenth Circuit accepted wholesale the premise that Title VII case law 
defines the standard for prevailing on an FHA sexual harassment claim.50 
In the employment context an employer violates Title VII by creating a 
discriminatory work environment, even if the employee loses no tangible 
job benefits, because the harassment is a barrier to equality in the 
workplace. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 91 L. Ed. 
2d 49, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986) (employer forcing plaintiff to engage in 
sex in the workplace created hostile environment). Applied to housing, a 
claim is actionable when the offensive behavior unreasonably interferes 
with use and enjoyment of the premises. The harassment must be 
“sufficiently severe or pervasive” to alter the conditions of the housing 
arrangement. See Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1413. It is not sufficient if the 
harassment is isolated or trivial. Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 
65. “‘Casual or isolated manifestations of a discriminatory
environment . . . may not raise a cause of action.’” Hicks, 833 F.2d at
1414 (quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 205 U.S. App. D.C. 444, 641 F.2d 934,
943 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). The offensive acts need not be purely sexual;
it is sufficient that they would not have happened but for claimant’s
gender. Hicks 833 F.2d at 1415. Evidence of harassment of other female
tenants is relevant to plaintiff’s claim. See Id.
 In Hicks, we remanded for a determination of whether sexual 
touching, sexual remarks and threats of violence in the workplace 
constituted a hostile environment. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1415. Hostile 
environment claims usually involve a long-lasting pattern of highly 
offensive behavior. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 205 U.S. App. D.C. 444, 
641 F.2d 934.51 
Every case cited here was brought under Title VII, yet the court did 
not question the appropriateness of extending these holdings to claims 
brought under a separate statute and arising from offenses in a distinct 
context. 
Similarly, when the Seventh Circuit heard its first case of sexual 
harassment under the FHA, it denied the claim because it found that the 
harassment did not “create an objectively hostile housing environment” 
based on case law from hostile work environment claims.52 In DiCenso v. 
Cisneros, the landlord came to the victim’s door to collect the rent and 
“began caressing her arm and back. He said to her words to the effect that 
if she could not pay the rent, she could take care of it in other ways.”53 The 
50. Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1090 (10th Cir. 1993). 
51. Id.
52. DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008–09 (7th Cir. 1996).
53. Id. at 1006.
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victim slammed the door in the landlord’s face, and he responded by 
standing outside and “calling her names—a ‘bitch’ and ‘whore,’ and then 
left.”54 Subsequently, the landlord asserted that the victim did not pay rent 
and served a notice to quit the premises.55 In evaluating the tenant’s claim, 
the Seventh Circuit did not disturb the factual finding that the landlord had 
committed an act of sexual harassment but stated, “[w]e repeatedly have 
held that isolated and innocuous incidents do not support a finding of 
sexual harassment” sufficient to establish a hostile environment.56 In 
support, the court cited only cases brought under Title VII and argued that 
“[c]ommon to all of these examples is an emphasis on the frequency of the 
offensive behavior. ‘Though sporadic behavior, if sufficiently abusive, 
may support a [discrimination] claim, success often requires repetitive 
misconduct.’”57 The court used this Title VII standard to find against the 
plaintiff:  
In this context, the problem with [the tenant’s] complaint is that 
although [the landlord] may have harassed her, he did so only once. 
Moreover, [the landlord’s] conduct, while clearly unwelcome, was much 
less offensive than other incidents which have not violated Title 
VII. [The landlord’s] comment vaguely invited [the tenant] to exchange
sex for rent, and while [the landlord] caressed [her] arm and back, he did
not touch an intimate body part, and did not threaten [her] with any
physical harm. There is no question that [the tenant] found [his] remarks
to be subjectively unpleasant, but this alone did not create an objectively
hostile environment.58
Here the court applied the Title VII standard without considering 
whether that standard was suitable for the home setting or whether an act 
should be considered more severe when occurring at home or by a 
landlord. The court declared that “[w]e stress in closing that our decision 
today should not be read as giving landlords one free chance to harass their 
tenants.”59 But as one scholar pointed out, “[i]t is hard to see, however, 
how this decision does not establish exactly that standard. Despite the 
judicial protestations to the contrary, the Honce and DiCenso cases 
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1007–08.
57. Id. (quoting Chalmers v. Quaker Oats Co., 61 F.3d 1340, 1345 (7th Cir. 1995)).
58. Id. at 1008–09.
59. Id. at 1009.
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demonstrate that some amount of harassment is acceptable” in the home, 
just as at work.60 
Courts largely imported Title VII sexual harassment standards into the 
housing setting without questioning their fit.61 As discussed below, special 
conditions of harassment at home justify developing standards tailored to 
the FHA to evaluate harassment in housing. 
IV. The Unique Nature of Sexual Harassment under the
FHA 
Scholars have repeatedly asserted that Title VII standards are ill-fitted 
for sexual harassment claims under the FHA.62 One reason for this is that 
the text of the FHA protects against more behavior than does Title VII: 
[C]ourts have simply interpreted the Fair Housing Act (FHA) to prohibit
sexual harassment to the same degree—and only to the same degree—as
it is prohibited in employment by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
This is inappropriate. It is true that the FHA contains a “terms and
conditions” provision that parallels the one in Title VII that has been the
key to sexual harassment law in employment. But the FHA also contains
an additional provision—§ 3604(c)—that bans sexually discriminatory
statements in a way that goes well beyond its Title VII counterpart.63
Section 3604(c) of the FHA states that it is unlawful “[t]o make, print, 
or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, 
statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling 
60. Balos, supra note 34, at 84.
61. In an interesting exception to this trend, not all courts have accepted that housing
discrimination is actionable under the FHA after a tenant obtains a unit (post-acquisition) despite post-
hiring claims being universally recognized as falling under Title VII’s purview. Title VII lacks explicit 
language about actionability after hiring, yet some courts have viewed the lack of such language in 
the FHA as indicating that post-acquisition claims fall beyond its scope. Aric Short, Post-Acquisition 
Harassment and the Scope of the Fair Housing Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 203, 240–242 (2006) (discussing 
Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(denying post-acquisition application of § 3604(a))); Spencer Bailey, Winning the Battle and the War 
against Housing Discrimination: Post-Acquisition Discrimination Claims under the Fair Housing Act, 
28 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 223, 224–25 (2019). See also Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 
F.3d 771, 776–78 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (recognizing post-acquisition cause of action for
constructive eviction).
62. See, e.g., Nicole A. Forkenbrock Lindemyer, Sexual Harassment on the Second Shift: The 
Misfit Application of Title VII Employment Standards to Title VIII Housing Cases, 18 L. & INEQ. 351 
(2000); Balos, supra note 34; Oliveri, supra note 41; Alyssa George, The Blind Spots of Law and 
Culture: How the Workplace Paradigm of Sexual Harassment Marginalizes Sexual Harassment in the 
Home, 17 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 645, 647 (2016) (asserting that applying Title VII standards 
“foreclos[es] recovery for many serious invasions of a tenant’s privacy and autonomy”). 
63. Schwemm & Oliveri, supra note 49, at 773.
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that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on . . . 
sex.”64 Scholars Rigel Oliveri and Robert Schwemm argue that while 
§ 3604(c) is similar to Section 2000e-3(b) of Title VII, which makes it
unlawful “to print or publish or cause to be printed or published any notice
or advertisement . . . indicating any preference, limitation, specification,
or discrimination, based on . . . sex,”65 the provision in the FHA is
broader.66 By extending its prohibitions to discriminatory statements,
§ 3604(c) provides a source of law that would seem to cover many types
of verbal harassment that are in no way addressed by Title VII.67 For
example, even when a tenant already lives in a unit, discriminatory
statements by a landlord may include those that express a desire to engage
in a sexual relationship with the tenant, thereby conveying a preference
related to the continued rental of the home.
Beyond the text of the statutes, there are significant differences 
between work and home in the law and in practice, and these differences 
impact the nature of sexual harassment in each setting. Sexual harassment 
under the FHA should be viewed and adjudicated distinctly based on the 
unique legal status of the home, the functional differences between the 
work and housing settings, the particularity of the landlord-tenant 
relationship, and vulnerabilities that many victims of sexual harassment in 
housing share. This section will address each of these points. 
Efforts to distinguish between these two contexts do not intend “to 
minimize the effects of sexual harassment in the workplace, or to stratify 
sexual harassment and rank its severity.”68 Courts can differentiate 
between harassment in these settings without minimizing the harm to 
which victims of workplace harassment are subjected. Furthermore, these 
two types of harassment “are inherently inter-related. As sexual 
harassment is a form of sex discrimination aimed at perpetuating women’s 
subordination, harassing conduct at work impedes women’s ability to fully 
participate in the marketplace, thereby keeping them in a position of 
financial vulnerability.”69 This position makes women all the more likely 
to be preyed on by unscrupulous landlords and housing providers. 
64. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b). 
66. Schwemm & Oliveri, supra note 49, at 790.
67. Id.
68. Lindemyer, supra note 62, at 353.
69. Id.
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A. The Unique Legal Status of the Home
Because the home has been repeatedly held to occupy a special place 
in American jurisprudence (and in public opinion), standards designed for 
employment situations may not be suitable in this special sphere. 
Courts have historically recognized that homes are protected by strong 
legal privacy interests. For example, the Supreme Court has declared that 
[t]he Fourth Amendment protects the individual’s privacy in a variety of 
settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when 
bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s 
home—a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional 
terms: “The right of the people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . shall 
not be violated.”70 
Scholar Beverley Balos discusses the Supreme Court’s recognition of 
unique privacy interests in the home, stating that “the notion of the special 
status of the home as a repository of an enhanced right to privacy was 
articulated by the Supreme Court when it found that the state could not 
regulate the private possession of obscene material in the privacy of one’s 
own home.”71 Balos goes on to say that “[t]he tradition of attributing a 
unique status to privacy in the home has continued. The Supreme Court 
has acknowledged that protecting privacy of the home is of the highest 
order,”72 calling it the “last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick”73 
and the “one retreat to which men and women can repair to escape from 
the tribulations of their daily pursuits.”74 The privacy interests attached to 
the home are unique and suggest that standards tailored to the home setting 
are appropriate in adjudicating sexual harassment that occurs there. 
While the unique legal character of the home has sometimes been tied 
to or predicated on property ownership, courts should acknowledge the 
special nature of the home even for victims who do not own their homes. 
Balos recognizes that “[t]he privileged position of the home in American 
jurisprudence is tied to . . . the sanctity of property rights” but argues that 
courts have applied—and still apply—this concept in a manner that chiefly 
harms women.75 Courts formerly looked the other way in domestic 
70. Payton v. N.Y., 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1979) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). 
71. Balos, supra note 34, at 91 (citing Stanley v. Ga., 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (“[A] State 
has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films 
he may watch.”)). 
72. Id. (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)). 
73. Id. (quoting Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring)). 
74. Id. at 91–92 (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 471).
75. Balos, supra note 34, at 87, 91–92; see Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) 
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violence cases citing privacy interests,76 and while they no longer do this, 
they allow property rights to affect sexual harassment claims in a way that, 
too, predominantly hurts women: 
While there is a tradition of protecting the home from state intervention, 
the extent of the protection is determined by the characteristics of the 
person making the request for protection. Individualized private property 
and the protection of that property redound to the benefit of the powerful. 
Poor women tenants do not tend to reap the benefit of the protection of 
private property when they are subject to sexual harassment in their 
homes by the landlord. Rather, the landlord’s right to engage in the 
private rental transaction, even if it includes a demand of sex for shelter, 
and his right to control his private property are protected at the expense 
of the privacy and security of the tenant.77 
Balos argues that courts must correct this disparate application of the 
law and act to protect victims of sexual harassment at home.78 The 
longstanding judicial recognition of the “sanctity of the home”79 should 
protect victims of sexual harassment at home, regardless of whether they 
own their homes. 
Scholars also point out that, independent of property rights, the home 
plays a special role in both personal identity and familial relationships: “It 
fosters intimate relationships and allows family life to flourish. It is also a 
place of safety and physical comfort. Beyond relational intimacy, the 
home also functions as a symbol for a feeling of belonging and a place 
where one can realize one’s potential.”80 Judges have recognized this 
(quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)) (noting that the Supreme Court has referred 
to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as “protection against all governmental invasions ‘of the sanctity 
of a man’s home and the privacies of life’”). 
76. Balos, supra note 34, at 87, (“One of the most powerful societal values that has reinforced 
the vulnerability of women to domestic violence has been the concept of the private, domestic sphere. 
Physical abuse of a wife by her husband was deemed a private matter and therefore not appropriate 
for state intervention. The privileging of privacy connected with the home resulted in a history of 
judicial decisions that refused to recognize the harm suffered by a victim of domestic violence and 
therefore a refusal to recognize a legal remedy.”). 
77. Id. at 90 (internal citations omitted). 
78. Id. at 105.
79. Balos, supra note 34, at 89–90 (citing United States v. Oliver, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980) (ruling that the sanctity of the home provides special protection
and prohibits warrantless arrest in one’s home); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (finding
an ordinance prohibiting residential picketing constitutional because “[t]he State’s interest
in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a
free and civilized society.”) (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 471))).
80. Balos, supra note 34, at 90.
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feature and its impact on the legal status of the home. For example, in 
Griswold v. Connecticut Justice Goldberg stated, 
I agree with Mr. Justice Harlan’s statement in his dissenting opinion 
in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551—552, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 
1781: ”Certainly the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely 
from the sanctity of property rights. The home derives its pre-eminence 
as the seat of family life. And the integrity of that life is something so 
fundamental that it has been found to draw to its protection the principles 
of more than one explicitly granted Constitutional right.”81 
The private and familial natures of the home distinguish it from the 
workplace and entitle it to protections and standards tailored to its unique 
status. 
Another feature of the unique legal status of the home that may apply 
in the context of sexual harassment of tenants is the implied “covenant of 
quiet enjoyment,” which has been long-recognized as applying to rental 
contracts unless explicitly contradicted.82 Through this covenant, “the 
landlord agrees that the tenant shall peaceably and quietly enjoy the leased 
premises for the term of the lease. The covenant is breached by the 
landlord when the enjoyment of the leased premises is substantially 
interfered with by the landlord [or] those claiming under him.”83 While 
this covenant is a feature of contract law, some courts have applied it in 
FHA harassment claims.84 For example, the Ninth Circuit held that § 
3604(b)’s “inclusion of the word ‘privileges’ implicates continuing rights, 
such as the privilege of quiet enjoyment of the dwelling.”85 This covenant 
distinguishes the home setting from work because no similar covenant 
applies in the workplace. The covenant provides tenants with an 
expectation of peace and enjoyment that does not exist at work, so some 
conduct that may be considered insufficiently severe at work to qualify as 
81. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, concurring). 
82. See, e.g., C. S. Parnell, Annotation, Breach of Covenant for Quiet Enjoyment in Lease, 41 
A.L.R.2d 1414 (originally published in 1955); Clarence M. Lewis, Covenant for Quiet Enjoyment in
Lease, 26 LAWYER & BANKER & CENT. L.J. 80, 80 (1933). 
83. Lewis, supra note 82, at 80–81. Note that courts have disagreed over whether actual or
constructive eviction is required for a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Barbara J. Van 
Arsdale et al., 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 472 (2020). 
84. Bailey, supra note 61, at 241.
85. Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 713 (9th Cir. 
2009). But see Bailey, supra note 61, at 241 (“[T]he [Seventh Circuit’s] view of what it means for a 
term, condition, or privilege to be sufficiently connected to the purchase of the property excludes some 
privileges that one might expect to be included. For example, the court did not recognize a ‘privilege 
of quiet enjoyment’ that other courts have found in § 3604(b) because this ‘privilege’ is granted upon 
purchasing property.”) (discussing Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc)). 
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sexual harassment discrimination under Title VII may qualify under the 
FHA by infringing on the victim’s covenanted right to peaceful and quiet 
enjoyment of their rental property. 
The home occupies a distinct position in the law. Because the home is 
legally unique, FHA claims should be evaluated under a standard unique 
to housing and the context of the home should be given weight when 
determining the severity of harassment there. 
B. Functional Differences Between the Housing and Employment
Settings 
There are significant functional differences between the workplace 
and home that impact sexual harassment occurring in each place; these 
differences further necessitate legal standards tailored to the housing 
setting. 
Fundamentally, one’s home is where—of all settings—one ought to 
have the most control and feel the safest. Unlike a work setting, where 
business needs and company culture dictate the nature of the physical 
environment and interpersonal interactions, the occupants of a home are 
able (or should be able) to control their living space physically, culturally, 
and interpersonally. Furthermore, physical and legal barriers to entry 
define the home as off-limits to all whom an occupant chooses not to 
allow; at work, an employee has little to no control over the comings and 
goings of others. Accordingly, sexual harassment in one’s own home may 
make a victim feel more violated than would harassment at work by 
voiding a victim’s ability to enjoy the home as a place of physical 
sanctuary.86 Likewise, offensive statements may be inherently more 
objectionable in one’s home than in public, rendering judicial instructions 
against interpreting anti-harassment statutes as “a general civility code” 
less applicable in the home, where a person should expect to control the 
manner of civility. The requirement of objective offense may also be less 
relevant in housing; while the “reasonable person” may be a suitable meter 
of offensiveness in public, residents determine what is too offensive for 
their own homes. Courts should recognize and protect victims’ rights to 
dictate the guests, activities, and interactions that occur in their homes. 
86. See Shirley Darby Howell, Domestic Violence, Flawed Interpretations of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437(D)(L)(6), Sexual Harassment in Public Housing, and Municipal Violations of the Eighth 
Amendment: Making Women Homeless and Keeping Them Homeless, 13 JONES L. REV. 1, 17 (2008)
(“Sexual harassment in the home threatens one’s fundamental dignity differently than marketplace
harassment,” and “harassment in the home subjects the victim to an elevated aspect of terror.”). 
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Additionally, business pressures may disincentivize harassment in 
ways that the housing setting does not. Work settings typically involve 
common spaces and multiple employees present; this may disincentivize 
harassment when it could be overseen and risk the harasser’s job or 
reputation. This pressure is less influential in the housing setting because 
most tenants interact with their landlords privately. Furthermore, for 
workplace harassment the competing interests of the harasser and the 
company clash, but in housing this is often not the case. At work, a 
perpetrator’s desire to harass always conflicts with a company’s interest 
because the harassment risks low productivity, high turnover, and 
significant legal and public opinion costs to the company. In contrast, such 
employer-employee conflict usually does not exist in cases under the FHA 
because most often the harassing landlord is also the owner of the 
property.87 Consequently, the pressures on a perpetrator in the workplace 
to avoid, limit, or hide their harassing behavior may not similarly constrain 
harassers in housing.88 
Harassment in housing is also shaped by the fact that a landlord is 
often the “sole point of contact for the [victims] with respect to their 
housing,”89 while victims of harassment at work typically have numerous 
points of contact.90 While employers provide anti-harassment trainings 
that at least notify victims that harassment at work violates the law and 
company policy, tenants are not typically similarly informed. Neither 
owner-landlords nor landlords tasked with providing such information on 
behalf of a housing company are likely to share such information with 
victims. Without direct contact with a parent company, a tenant does not 
receive top-down messages or policies against harassment like an 
employee does. Moreover, formal channels for reporting harassment, 
standard in the work setting, are typically unavailable when landlords 
harass and are the sole point of contact for tenants. 
87. Lindemyer, supra note 62, at 381.
88. While all harassers face risks of criminal sanctions, civil suits, and professional and
reputational ruin, this distinction still creates fewer limiting pressures on harassers in housing than at 
work. 
89. Oliveri, supra note 41, at 620 (“[a]ll of the women believed that the person who harassed
them was the owner of the property and also served as its manager. This meant that the landlord . . . 
was the sole point of contact for the women with respect to their housing.”). 
90. This is not to say that these points of contact will always terminate harassment. Numerous 
Title VII cases involve policies requiring the victim to report harassment to the harasser, and HR 
departments are sometimes ineffective in stopping or preventing harassment. See, e.g., Robyn South, 
What HR Is Still Facing Two Years into #MeToo, TLNT (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.tlnt.com/what-
hr-is-still-facing-two-years-into-metoo/; Suriani, supra note 31. Still, official policies against 
harassment and channels for reporting are certainly better than none. 
80] FHA Sexual Harassment Claims 
97 
These differences between the housing and employment settings 
render Title VII standards inappropriate when applied without distinction 
to housing cases. Oliveri illustrates this point with an example from the 
Eleventh Circuit: 
In another case, Tagliaferri v. Winter Park Housing Authority, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the maintenance man at their apartment complex 
set up a video camera at their bedroom window, photographed them 
while they were outside, and made obscene gestures at them. A three-
judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was 
asked to review the district court’s dismissal of the case for failure to 
state a claim under the FHA. The panel relied heavily on a Title VII 
sexual harassment case, Mendoza v. Borden, in which the plaintiff 
alleged a hostile work environment based, in part, on the allegation that 
her supervisor was constantly watching, following, and staring at her. 
The Mendoza court found that this behavior did not constitute severe or 
pervasive conduct because “the everyday observation of fellow 
employees in the workplace is also a natural and unavoidable occurrence 
when people work together in close quarters or when a supervisor keeps 
an eye on employees.” Despite the fact that there are profound contextual 
differences between a woman being watched by her supervisor at work 
and having the maintenance man of her apartment building set up a video 
camera facing her bedroom window, the Tagliaferri court failed to note 
this distinction and upheld the lower court’s dismissal in a per curiam 
opinion.91 
This illustrates how judges permit a range of behaviors that are truly 
unreasonable in housing when they restrict analysis of FHA claims to 
decisions made in the separate context of work. In adopting Title VII 
standards and denying FHA-based claims by comparing harassment at 
home to that in the workplace, courts have failed to offer the protection 
that the FHA should provide. 
C. The Distinctiveness of the Landlord-Tenant Relationship
Scholars have also argued that the nature of the landlord-tenant 
relationship indicates special conditions that should be considered in the 
housing context.92 As Oliveri declared, “blind reliance on employment law 
91. Oliveri, supra note 41, at 607 (citations omitted) (discussing Tagliaferri v. Winter Park 
Hous. Auth., 486 Fed. Appx. 771 (11th Cir. 2012); Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1248 
(11th Cir. 1999)). 
92. See, e.g., George, supra note 62; Balos, supra note 34. While sexual harassment may also 
be perpetuated by other tenants (see, e.g., Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC, 901 F.3d 
856 (7th Cir. 2018); G.B. v. Dipace, No. 1:14-CV-0500 (DNH/CFH), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51459 
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doctrines and precedents in the housing context fails to recognize that 
conduct that may appear harmless or less offensive in the workplace can 
become much more threatening when committed inside a woman’s home 
by someone who literally holds the keys.”93 
First, the tenant-landlord relationship is unique in the amount of 
control a landlord has over tenants’ physical safety. Landlords have keys 
to tenants’ living spaces, guaranteeing unfettered access.94 Furthermore, 
“[u]nlike at the workplace, the landlord can also use his access to threaten 
the tenant’s family members.”95 Given the common characteristics of 
victims (described in Part IV.D.) as women who are often heads of their 
households, this presents unique safety risks that do not apply to 
harassment in the work setting. Not only does sexual harassment at home 
carry the risk of a victim losing housing for herself and her dependents, it 
also carries the risk of subjecting dependents to harassment either directly 
or indirectly. Dependents may witness the victim receiving unwanted 
touching or sexual requests and may overhear threats and insults directed 
at the victim. Even more concerning, a harassing landlord could use his 
key to gain access to dependents, including when the victim is not home. 
Victims who face this risk are reasonable in feeling that harassment is 
more threatening at home than at work. 
Second, while harassment at work may involve a power imbalance, 
harassment by a housing provider always includes a significant disparity 
in the power of the parties. And since shortages in low-income housing are 
greater than shortages in jobs,96 the power differential between tenants and 
landlords is wider than at work as tenants are more replaceable than 
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2019)), this Note does not address the issue of liability under the FHA. 
93. Oliveri, supra note 41, at 605.
94. While laws restrict landlord access to dwellings without prior notice except in
emergencies, harassment victims describe landlords entering their homes without consent or notice. 
“[A] common aspect of sexual harassment in the home involves the landlord using his keys to enter 
the tenant’s home uninvited.” George, supra note 62, at 660–61. 
95. Id. 
96. See, e.g., Housing Cost Burden for Low-Income Renters Has Increased Significantly in Last 
Two Decades, NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION (July 06, 2020), 
https://nlihc.org/resource/housing-cost-burden-low-income-renters-has-increased-significantly-last-
two-decades; Patrick Sisson, Jeff Andrews & Alex Bazeley, The Affordable Housing Crisis,
Explained: Blame Policy, Demographics, and Market Forces, CURBED, 
https://www.curbed.com/2019/5/15/18617763/affordable-housing-policy-rent-real-estate-apartment
(last updated Mar. 2, 2020, 12:46 PM); Alexia Fernández Campbell, The US Is Experiencing a
Widespread Worker Shortage. Here’s Why, VOX (Mar. 18, 2019, 5:10 PM)
https://www.vox.com/2019/3/18/18270916/labor-shortage-workers-us. Low-income housing is
referenced because the majority of victims of sexual harassment in housing are in poverty. See supra
Part IV.D. Note that employment figures predate the 2020 economic downturn, but high 
unemployment will increase demand for the limited low-income housing available.
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employees. Oliveri discusses the unique power dynamic between 
landlords and tenants: 
This application of the Title VII standards to the home ignores the vastly 
different power structure that exists in the home. While sexual 
harassment in the workplace often involves supervisors or other 
superiors who have some level of control, the power differential between 
a landlord and a tenant, especially a poor tenant who receives 
government housing assistance, is far greater. Landlords are able to 
exercise power over their tenants by selecting and evicting tenants, 
setting the rent, and deciding which services to provide or withhold. The 
power imbalance between landlords and tenants is especially dramatic 
when affordable housing is limited and low-income tenants have few 
alternative housing options; in these circumstances, a tenant’s threat to 
vacate is weakened by the landlord’s ability to quickly replace the tenant, 
and withholding rent may simply provide the landlord with a basis for 
eviction. Knowing that many low-income tenants would fear the loss of 
their current housing if they resisted or reported harassment, more than 
the harassment itself, may lead some landlords to target this population.97 
Because tenants risk losing their housing and landlords are aware of 
tenants’ vulnerabilities, landlords are able to prey on these vulnerabilities 
to identify and exploit victims. 
The landlord-tenant relationship is unique and justifies a unique 
standard for harassment under the FHA. “What is most frequently and 
gravely overlooked by the courts in addressing the sexual harassment of 
women in their homes is the nature of the harassing conduct itself as 
inextricable from the context of the home. Acts of harassment in this 
intimate setting are per se severe.”98 This reality should encourage courts 
to tailor FHA standards to account for the unique relationship between the 
harasser and victim in housing. 
D. Vulnerabilities Common to Victims of Sexual Harassment in Housing
Many victims of sexual harassment in housing share common 
characteristics making them especially vulnerable. Like in the 
employment setting, most victims of sexual harassment in housing are 
women. This is unsurprising given historical and present discrepancies in 
power and property ownership99 and the fact that women bear the 
97. George, supra note 62, at 662 (citations omitted).
98. Lindemyer, supra note 62, at 352.
99. See, e.g., Lucas Hall, Portrait of an American Landlord, LANDLORDOLOGY, 
https://www.landlordology.com/portrait-american-landlord-infographic/ (last updated Mar. 14, 2015) 
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disproportionate burden of pervasive sexual violence in society.100 Beyond 
this, though, the uniqueness of harassment in housing likely creates a 
narrower pool of victims than in the employment setting. 
Nearly all reported victims of sexual harassment under the FHA are 
indigent.101 “Being a low-income tenant or experiencing poverty is a key 
factor in being vulnerable to sexual harassment in housing.”102 Poverty and 
gender interact because “women experience poverty at a disproportionate 
rate in our society.”103 In Cahan’s groundbreaking 1987 article, she 
discovered that “[o]f the sexual harassment reports in the survey for which 
specific characteristics were included, seventy-five percent of the women 
possessed annual incomes under $10,000, twenty-three percent between 
$10,000-$20,000 and the remaining two percent between $20,000-
$30,000.”104 Such poverty leaves women particularly vulnerable to 
exploitation surrounding housing when the risk of losing whatever 
housing they can afford often means homelessness.105 
Many victims are also the heads of their households: “Looking at the 
descriptions of the plaintiffs in the reported federal cases reveals that they 
are poor women, often providing the only support for their families and 
(revealing that only 15% of American landlords are female). 
100. See, e.g., Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network, Victims of Sexual Violence: Statistics,
RAINN.ORG, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/victims-sexual-violence (last visited Sep. 18, 2020). 
101. Oliveri, supra note 41, at 610.
102. Balos, supra note 34, at 97; see also Elengold, supra note 35, at 253 (“Scholars who have 
specifically written about sexual harassment in rental housing have nearly all found that poverty is a 
critical factor in assessing a female tenant’s susceptibility to sexual harassment. . . . Statistics and case 
law establish that poverty is, indeed, a primary risk factor for experiencing sexual harassment in rental 
housing.”). 
103. Balos, supra note 34, at 97.
104. Cahan, supra note 45, at 1067 (citation omitted). For context, the poverty level in 1987 for 
a family of four was set at $11,000. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Family Poverty Status and Family 
Poverty Level Variables, NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL SURVEYS, 
https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy79/other-documentation/codebook-supplement/nlsy79-
appendix-2-total-net-family-3 (last visited Mar. 22, 2020). See also Kathleen Butler, Sexual 
Harassment in Rental Housing, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 175 (1989) (“Limited by their low incomes, ten 
million households headed by women must live in substandard housing.”). 
105. Balos, supra note 34, at 97. Because of their poverty, many victims qualify for housing
assistance in the form of Section 8 Vouchers or public housing. Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 947, 
954 (8th Cir. 2010); Oliveri, supra note 41, at 618–19. There is some debate about whether these forms 
of assistance actually increase vulnerability to harassment. “Many scholars assert—without 
evidence—that women are more likely to be harassed if they use vouchers or live in public housing. 
In reality, it appears that receiving housing subsidies makes a poor woman no more likely to be 
harassed and . . . may improve her outcomes if she is harassed.” Oliveri, supra note 41, at 618–19. 
The reason that victims who receive subsidies may have better outcomes is that the subsidies 
supplement rent, making recipients more able to stay current on rent than they could without the 
subsidies. Accordingly, landlords may be less able to evade liability for evicting subsidy recipients 
because the common pretext of failure to pay rent is less available. Id. 
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often facing homelessness.”106 This is also unsurprising given that 
“[f]emale-headed households are more than twice as likely as all U.S. 
households to face poverty (27.9 percent vs. 12.3 percent).”107 Many of 
these women are single mothers who remain in a housing situation despite 
harassment in order to keep children housed.108 
Accordingly, women of color may be more likely than their white 
counterparts to become victims of sexual harassment in housing.109 The 
grim economic situation for female-headed households “is compounded 
for women of color, who experience both sex and race discrimination. 
Census data show that households headed by single Indigenous, Latina, 
African American, and Native Hawaiian women have an even higher risk 
of poverty (39.7 percent, 37.4 percent, 34.7 percent, and 31.2 percent, 
respectively).”110 
Scholar Kate Elengold discusses how these statistics have interplayed 
with the image of a deviant landlord to ignore the plight of Black women 
facing particular structural vulnerability to sexual harassment in 
housing.111 She analyzes what she calls the “dirty old man” narrative: the 
image of the perpetrator “as a man acting outside of the standards of 
society and the law. Because the term ‘dirty old man’ is often employed 
as a means of encouraging, explaining or excusing behavior that is outside 
of cultural norms, [it]. . .risks trivializing the crime of sexual 
harassment.”112 This narrative ignores the pronounced history of structural 
access to Black women’s homes and bodies and combines with the 
historical Black “Jezebel” myth to uniquely harm Black women tenants in 
a way that is underrecognized.113 While “[t]he landlord’s access to tenants, 
106. Balos, supra note 34, at 97.
107. Bread for the World, Fact Sheet: Hunger and Poverty in Female-Headed Households
(May 2019), https://www.bread.org/sites/default/files/downloads/hunger-poverty-female-headed-
households-may-2019.pdf. See also Balos, supra note 34, at 97 (“[I]n 1998 the U.S. Census Bureau 
reported that 12.7% of the general population was living in poverty while 29.9% of female-headed 
households were living in poverty.”). 
108. See, e.g., Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1094 (10th Cir. 1993) (Seymour, dissenting);
Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 944 (8th Cir. 2010); Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487, 489 (9th Cir. 
1997). 
109. Elengold, supra note 35; Lindemyer, supra note 62; George, supra note 62, at 647
(“tenants who are most at risk of being harassed by their landlords are low-income women of color 
who depend on government assistance for the continuity of their housing situation.”); Oliveri, supra 
note 41, at 617 (“The women who reported experiencing harassment by their landlords were 
disproportionately likely to be racial minorities.”). 
110. Bread for the World, supra note 107.
111. Elengold, supra note 35.
112. Id. at 229.
113. Id. at 230, 269, 272–73 (“A landlord’s access to his female tenants and their families is 
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of course, is generally the same, regardless of the tenant’s race,” Black 
women “are burdened by the cultural myth of the Black Jezebel and the 
historical ways in which Black women have been subjected to sexual 
assault in the private sphere without protection or recourse,” making the 
landlord’s access even more dangerous than for other women.114 Courts 
should consider both the unique setting of the home and the unique 
vulnerability of Black women in adjudicating FHA claims. 
While sexual harassment victims under both Title VII and the FHA 
are likely to be women, the particular nature of harassment in the housing 
context involves certain other characteristics common to victims. The 
acute vulnerability of women sharing these characteristics should be 
considered by courts in evaluating the nature and severity of harassment 
in their housing arrangements. 
V. Court Decisions Considering the Unique Setting of the
Home in FHA Sexual Harassment Claims before HUD’s
2016 Rule 
Before HUD issued 24 CFR § 100.600 in 2016, some courts 
considered the unique setting of the home in their analysis of sexual 
harassment claims brought under the FHA.115 Cases considering the 
special nature of harassment in housing will hereinafter be referred to as 
“Housing Context Cases.” The approach of the Housing Context Cases 
has been applied by a minority of courts, but it models how courts can 
consider the particular nature of harassment in housing, even when 
adopting the Title VII framework. 
structural, not a result of a deviancy. In other words, a landlord has access to a tenant and her family 
due to the legal rights inherent in the landlord-tenant relationship and economic and racial hierarchies 
throughout American history.”). Elengold explains the Jezebel myth: “Since the days of slavery, 
African American women have been confronted with the myth that Black women are promiscuous 
and hyper-sexual, often referred to as the Jezebel myth. . . . The institutional acceptance of the Jezebel 
myth leads to dual outcomes: excusing the sexual abuse of Black women and silencing resistance.” Id. 
at 244, 269. 
114. Id. at 269.
115. Elengold, supra note 35, at 252 (“Although courts have not gone as far as scholars and
advocates would like in recognizing how residential sexual harassment invades the sanctity of the 
woman’s home, the concept has gained some traction in case law. Of the more than one hundred court 
opinions on residential sexual harassment, twelve courts explicitly highlighted or discussed the fact 
that the harassing conduct occurred in the woman’s home, a place where she should feel safe and 
secure. That count does not include factual assertions that would indicate the invasion of the sanctity 
of a woman’s home (i.e. illegal use of passkey or plaintiff’s fear of defendant at home) without further 
discussion by the court. Cahan’s argument has been cited favorably by three federal district courts, 
HUD, and at least two state and federal trial and appellate briefs.”) (internal citations omitted) 
(discussing Cahan, supra note 45). 
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The earliest Housing Context Case was Beliveau v. Caras.116 The 
District Court for the Central District of California considered the 
following facts on a motion to dismiss: 
Beliveau noticed that Rickell [the resident manager] was staring at her 
while she was laying out by the apartment pool in her bathing suit. 
During that same time period, Rickell “began making off-color, 
flirtatious and unwelcome remarks to Beliveau.” Also during this time 
frame, Rickell “went to Plaintiff’s apartment to repair a water leak in her 
shower, when he thereafter called her into the bathroom, proceeded to 
put his arm around her, told her she was an attractive woman, he would 
like to keep her company any time, and made a remark about her breasts, 
referring to them as ‘headlights.’” Beliveau pushed him away, and he 
“grabbed her breast, and, after being pushed away again, grabbed her 
buttock as she walked away from him.”117 
The Beliveau court recognized the special nature of the home setting in 
denying the landlord’s motion to dismiss: 
[This] incident of offensive touching . . . if proved, would constitute a 
sexual battery under California Civil Code § 1708.5. Any such touching 
would support a sexual harassment claim under the federal Fair Housing 
Act. Particularly where, as here, the alleged battery was committed (1) 
in plaintiff’s own home, where she should feel (and be) less vulnerable, 
and (2) by one whose very role was to provide that safe environment, 
defendants’ contention that plaintiff has failed to allege “conduct that 
was so severe or pervasive to ‘alter the conditions’ of plaintiff’s housing 
environment” and has failed to “allege an ‘abusive’ housing 
environment” resulting from defendants’ conduct is not well-taken. 
There are few clearer examples of classic sexual harassment than an 
unpermitted, allegedly intentional, sexual touching. Under no 
circumstances should a woman have to risk further physical jeopardy 
simply to state a claim for relief under [the FHA]. Plaintiff has 
adequately alleged the requisite offensive housing environment.118 
This consideration of both the unique setting of the home and the 
landlord-tenant relationship was revolutionary as it recognized heightened 
egregiousness of such behavior occurring at home. Cases alleging similar 
facts are sometimes dismissed under the Title VII standard as “isolated 
events” combined with “mere offensive utterances.”119 Notably, the court 
116. Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
117. Id. at 1395 (internal citations omitted). 
118. Id. at 1398.
119. Schnapper, supra note 7, at 310–11 (Being “too mild to give rise to a Title VII claim, is
labeled, or more accurately dismissed, as ‘offensive,’ ‘merely offensive,’ ‘merely mildly offensive,’ 
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also referred to the Ninth Circuit’s acceptance of the “reasonable woman” 
standard under Title VII, further indicating its willingness to interpret the 
harassment as the victim would.120 
While this decision offered significant protection for victims, its 
influence has been fairly limited. California district courts have applied it, 
but before HUD’s 2016 rule only three other courts explicitly referenced 
Beliveau’s analysis of the uniqueness of the housing setting.121 
Despite the limited application of the Beliveau court’s reasoning in 
federal cases, consideration of the uniqueness of harassment at home 
gained traction in 2010 when a federal circuit court first applied similar 
reasoning in Quigley v. Winter: 
Quigley presented sufficient evidence of numerous unwanted 
interactions of a sexual nature that interfered with Quigley’s use and 
enjoyment of her home. Quigley testified Winter subjected her to 
unwanted touching on two occasions, made sexually suggestive 
comments, rubbed his genitals in front of her, placed several middle of 
the night phone calls to her home, made repeated unannounced visits, 
and, on one occasion, while Winter lay on Quigley’s couch, had to be 
told to leave her home at least three times before he complied. We 
‘vulgarity,’ ‘merely vulgar,’ ‘tasteless,’ ‘distasteful,’ ‘insensitive,’ or ‘inappropriate.’”) (internal 
citations omitted) (citing Shepherd v. Comptroller Pub. Acct., 168 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 1999); 
Harrington v. Boysville of Michigan, Inc., No. 97-1862, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 9796, at *14 (6th Cir. 
May 13, 1998) (unpublished disposition); Bermudez v. TRC Holdings, Inc, 138 F.3d 1176, 1181 (7th 
Cir. 1998); Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., 104 F.3d 822, 826 (6th Cir. 1997); Walker v. Soc. Health 
Ass’n, Inc., No. 94-3801, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 38830, at *5 (6th Cir. Dec. 21, 1995) (unpublished 
disposition); Thomas v. Shoney’s Inc., No. 94-1443, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 16456, at *5 (4th Cir. 
July 5, 1995) (unpublished disposition); Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430, 431 (7th 
Cir. 1995); Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1010 (7th Cir. 1994); 
Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 753 (4th Cir. 1996); Gleason v. Mesirow Fin., Inc., 
118 F.3d 1134, 1143–44 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
120. Beliveau, 873 F. Supp. at 1397–98 (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 79–80 (9th Cir. 
1991)). 
121. Reeves v. Carrollsburg Condo. Unit Owners Ass’n, No. 96-2495(RMU), 1997 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 21762, at *21 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1997) (“Plaintiff Reeves has shown a sufficient basis for 
bringing a sexual harassment suit. . . . It is noteworthy that at least one court has recognized that sexual 
harassment in the home may have more severe effects than harassment in the workplace. See Beliveau, 
873 F. Supp. at 1397 n. 1.”); Williams v. Poretsky Mgmt., 955 F. Supp. 490, 498 (D. Md. 1996) 
(“[A]lthough courts have looked to employment cases to determine housing claims, the settings are 
not completely analogous. At least one court has recognized that sexual harassment in the home may 
have more severe effects than harassment in the workplace. See Beliveau, 873 F. Supp. at 1397 n.1.”); 
Richards v. Bono, No. 5:04-cv-484-Oc-10GRJ, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43585, at *21–*22 (M.D. Fla. 
May 2, 2005) (“[T]he allegations in the complaint are more than sufficient to set forth a claim for 
severe and pervasive sexually hostile conduct. On various or multiple occasions, Mr. Bono exposed 
himself, demanded sex, ejaculated in front of her, grabbed her buttocks and breasts, kissed her, pushed 
her against the wall, knocked her to the ground, and fingered her underpants. This behavior is all the 
more egregious in that it was committed in the Plaintiff’s own home.”). 
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emphasize that Winter subjected Quigley to these unwanted interactions 
in her own home, a place where Quigley was entitled to feel safe and 
secure and need not flee, which makes Winter’s conduct even more 
egregious. 
. . . . 
Winter’s conduct was reprehensible. Quigley lived alone with small 
children at the time of Winter’s harassment, and she had few, if any, 
alternative housing options. Quigley’s financial vulnerability was 
evidenced by her need for Section 8 housing vouchers. Winter held a 
certain level of power over Quigley and her family. Winter repeatedly 
subjected Quigley to inappropriate conduct during Quigley’s tenancy, 
and Winter’s conduct was unquestionably intentional and more than 
churlish. Most significant, Winter’s conduct intruded upon Quigley’s 
sense of security in her own home.122 
The Eighth Circuit’s decision is remarkable for its consideration of 
several of the above-discussed factors that render harassment in the 
housing context unique, including the legal status of the home, the 
landlord-tenant relationship, and vulnerabilities common to victims. The 
court utilized the framework derived from Title VII,123 but its assessment 
that the harassment was particularly severe given the home setting 
indicated a departure from strictly applying Title VII standards. 
After Quigley, some other courts embraced the idea that FHA sexual 
harassment claims should be considered in light of factors unique to 
housing.124 Despite these Housing Context Cases, other courts continued 
to apply Title VII standards without distinction. Courts that did consider 
the housing setting faced the task of justifying their outcomes in light of 
FHA case law that failed to do so. For example, the District Court for the 
Eastern District of California in Salisbury v. Hickman noted that 
Defendants argue that the evidence in this case is no more egregious 
than that in DiCenso and Honce. To be sure, the complained-of 
harassment in this case was generally confined to two specific incidents, 
and like DiCenso and Honce, this case did not involve any violence, 
122. Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 947, 954 (8th Cir. 2010). 
123. While it did not explicitly mention Title VII, it applied the “severe or pervasive” standard 
that was imported in early FHA sexual harassment cases. Id. at 946–47. 
124. Salisbury v. Hickman, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1292–93 (E.D. Cal. 2013); Sharon T v. New
Directions, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-04239-SVW-E, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5646 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2016) 
(“[A]n agent in the housing context may gain access to a victim’s home and inflict violence upon the 
victim after the victim has reported harassment. Moreover, a tenant faces the risk of homelessness, 
which is arguably more severe than the risk of unemployment. . . . while there are certainly similarities 
between Title VII and the FHA, there are also significant differences.”). 
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overt threat of physical force, or touching of intimate body parts. 
Nevertheless, a close look at the circumstances surrounding the two 
incidents in this case reveals . . . factors that, when viewed in the light 
most favorable to Ms. Salisbury, distinguishes this case and could well 
lead a fact finder to conclude that Mr. Crimi’s conduct constituted severe 
sexual harassment. 
. . . . 
. . . . [P]erhaps most importantly, the second major incident of 
harassment on March 29, 2012, took place in Ms. Salisbury’s own home. 
Courts have recognized that harassment in one’s own home is 
particularly egregious and is a factor that must be considered in 
determining the seriousness of the alleged harassment. 
. . . . 
Finally, while this fact does not distinguish this case 
from DiCenso or Honce, it is nonetheless worth noting that Mr. Crimi is 
not any ordinary resident at Arrowhead; he is the community’s on-site 
manager. Generally speaking, sexual harassment by someone in a 
position of authority is more likely to be emotionally and 
psychologically threatening. . . . Presumably, as the on-site manager, 
Mr. Crimi is first in-line to respond to any issue that might interfere with 
Ms. Salisbury’s use and enjoyment of her residence, such as a rent 
dispute or a request for repairs. Mr. Crimi’s ability to influence Ms. 
Salisbury’s well-being thus adds yet another degree of severity to Mr. 
Crimi’s conduct.125 
By considering the housing context, the court reached a different result 
than in DiCenso and Honce despite similar harassing behavior. This 
recognition that similar acts may be more severe in the housing context 
than at work is critical for appropriately assessing and remedying harm to 
victims in the housing setting. 
VI. How 24 C.F.R. § 100.600 Applies and Distinguishes
Title VII Standards 
In 2016, HUD published a rule entitled “Quid Pro Quo and Hostile 
Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing 
Practices Under the Fair Housing Act.”126 This regulation “specifies how 
125. Salisbury v. Hickman, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1292–93 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (internal citations
omitted). 
126. Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory 
Housing Practices Under the Fair Housing Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 63,054 (Sept. 14, 2016) (codified at 24 
C.F.R. § 100 (2020)). 
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HUD will evaluate complaints of quid pro quo (‘this for that’) harassment 
and hostile environment harassment under the Fair Housing Act.”127 The 
rule was also intended to “provide for uniform treatment of Fair Housing 
Act claims raising allegations of quid pro quo and hostile environment 
harassment in judicial and administrative forums.”128 The Rule applies to 
harassment based on any protected class, including sex.129 This Note’s 
analysis is limited to Subpart H: 24 C.F.R. § 100.600 Quid pro quo and 
hostile environment harassment (hereafter known as “the Rule”) in the 
sexual harassment context. 
In the Rule’s Background section, HUD recognizes the history of 
adjudicating FHA harassment claims using Title VII standards and admits 
that the fit is not perfect: 
[W]hen deciding harassment cases under the Fair Housing Act, courts
have often looked to case law decided under Title VII . . . [b]ut the home
and the workplace are significantly different environments such that
strict reliance on Title VII case law is not always appropriate. One’s
home is a place of privacy, security, and refuge (or should be), and
harassment that occurs in or around one’s home can be far more
intrusive, violative and threatening than harassment in the more public
environment of one’s work place. Consistent with this reality, the
Supreme Court has recognized that individuals have heightened
expectations of privacy within the home.
This rule therefore formalizes standards to address harassment in and 
around one’s home and identifies some of the differences between 
harassment in the home and harassment in the workplace. While Title 
VII and Fair Housing Act case law contain many similar concepts, this 
regulation describes the appropriate analytical framework for 
harassment claims under the Fair Housing Act.130 
Importantly, this displays HUD’s acceptance of the Housing Context 
Cases’ analysis that harassment at home is qualitatively different from 
harassment at work and should be adjudicated by considering the nature 
of the housing setting. The Rule solidifies the application of Title VII 
standards to the FHA in some ways while distinguishing it in others. While 




130. Id. at 63,055–56 (internal citations omitted). 
131. For example, the Rule is clear by forbidding interference of the “use or enjoyment of a
dwelling” (language not found in the FHA itself) that post-acquisition discrimination is actionable 
under the FHA. 24 C.F.R. § 100.600(a)(2) (2020). See supra note 61. 
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the matter of how closely Title VII case law should apply to harassment in 
the home. This Note will consider each subsection of the Rule in turn to 
identify which elements are borrowed from Title VII case law and which 
are not. 
A. Subsections Applying to Both Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment
Claims 
Subsection (b) of the Rule clarifies that harassment need not include 
physical harm to violate the FHA.132 While physical harm is not required 
by the text of either statute, some courts have denied claims under the 
FHA—like under Title VII—because the type of touching was not 
considered offensive enough133 or because the alleged behavior did not 
involve physical touching and was thus considered insufficiently severe or 
pervasive.134 This clarification protects victims by recognizing that non-
physical harassment still creates fear, anxiety, and emotional distress, 
especially when occurring in the home.135 
In subsection (c), the Rule clarifies that a single incident may violate 
the FHA if it meets the standard for either type of harassment.136 While 
courts technically recognized this before the Rule, they sometimes 
demanded a series of offenses to find hostile environment under the 
FHA.137 For example, in Rich v. Lubin, the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York stated that “[i]solated or sporadic sexually 
inappropriate acts are not sufficiently pervasive and severe to constitute 
sexual harassment under the FHA.”138 This stance was imported from Title 
VII cases.139 The Rule’s acceptance of claims based on one incident was 
132. 24 C.F.R. § 100.600(b) (2020). 
133. See, e.g., DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1996).
134. See, e.g., Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1090–91 (10th Cir. 1993).
135. See supra Part IV.B.
136. 24 C.F.R. § 100.600(c) (2020). 
137. See supra Part III. DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1008–09; Macias v. Lange, No. 14cv2763-
GPC(JMA), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44907, at *26 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2016) (“One or two occasions 
of sexual harassment is not enough to create a hostile environment.”). 
138. Rich v. Lubin, No. 02 Civ. 6786 (TPG), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9091, at *12 (S.D.N.Y.
May 20, 2004). 
139. Id. (citing Abrams v. Merlino, 694 F. Supp. 1101, 1104 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (FHA case
analogizing Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)); Anonymous v. Goddard 
Riverside Cmty. Ctr. No. 96 Civ. 9198 (SAS), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9724, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 
1997) (FHA case citing Title VII case Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2d Cir. 1986) to 
hold that “a single incident of harassment cannot give rise to a hostile environment claim.”)). But see 
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 277, 280 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“[A]n isolated 
incident of harassment can amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of 
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also accepted in the Housing Context Cases140 and is justified given the 
differences in the housing and employment contexts. As described above, 
harassment may be inherently more severe in the housing setting than at 
work, which should lower the requisite pervasiveness of the offensive 
conduct. The standard is “severe or pervasive,” and severity and 
pervasiveness relate inversely such that more severe conduct need be less 
pervasive to qualify (or not pervasive at all if a single act is very severe).141 
Furthermore, the identity of most housing harassers as owner-landlord142 
justifies actionability based on one act because knowledge of and ability 
to respond to harassment are typically more direct than in the work 
setting.143 The Rule takes a positive step in incorporating the Beliveau 
court’s reasoning that “[u]nder no circumstances should a woman have to 
risk further physical jeopardy simply to state a claim for relief.”144 
B. Quid Pro Quo Harassment
Subsection (a)(1) establishes that quid pro quo harassment consists of: 
[A]n unwelcome request or demand to engage in conduct where
submission to the request or demand, either explicitly or implicitly, is
made a condition related to: The sale, rental or availability of a dwelling;
the terms, conditions, or privileges of the sale or rental, or the provision
of services or facilities in connection therewith; or the availability, terms,
or conditions of a residential real estate-related transaction. An
unwelcome request or demand may constitute quid pro quo harassment
even if a person acquiesces in the unwelcome request or demand.145
employment if that incident is extremely serious.”) (internal punctuation omitted). 
140. Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393, 1398 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
141. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (“We first note that the 
required showing of severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with the 
pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.”). See King v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898 
F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir.1990) (“Although a single act can be enough . . . generally, repeated incidents
create a stronger claim of hostile environment, with the strength of the claim depending on the number
of incidents and the intensity of each incident.”). This is a Title VII case, indicating that courts are 
wrong to require more than one incident even under Title VII. Notably, the court in Rich v. Lubin erred 
in calling the standard “severe and pervasive.”
142. Lindemyer, supra note 62, at 381 (“[A]s evidenced in the majority of residential sexual
harassment claims addressed in federal courts, vicarious liability is infrequently controverted because 
the owner/landlord and the harasser are often one and the same person.”). 
143. This may relate to the disapplication of the Faragher-Ellerth defense to the housing setting.
24 C.F.R. § 100.600 (a)(2)(ii) (2020) (discussed below). The affirmative defense essentially allows 
that “for employers of harassing supervisors . . . the first bite is free.” Grossman, supra note 29, at 
671. This is even less appropriate in the housing context.
144. Beliveau, 873 F. Supp. at 1398.
145. 24 C.F.R. § 100.600(a)(1) (2020). 
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This definition aligns with judicial recognition that implicit requests or 
demands qualify as quid pro quo claims.146 The Honce court—citing a 
Title VII case—stated that “‘[q]uid pro quo’ harassment occurs when 
housing benefits are explicitly or implicitly conditioned on sexual 
favors.”147 
This language also addresses a difficulty that has plagued quid pro quo 
claims under the imported Title VII standard. Some courts have only 
recognized quid pro quo claims where an adverse action was actually 
taken, not merely threatened.148 As one scholar stated, 
As under Title VII, in the housing context, the threat of adverse 
consequences based on a refusal to submit to sexual demands is not 
sufficient to state a quid pro quo claim. Instead, the tenant must 
demonstrate that she has already suffered tangible harm . . . This 
standard directs the court’s attention to the tenant’s reaction to the sexual 
demands and requires that a tenant wait until adverse actions have 
occurred rather than empowering the court to act based on inappropriate 
conduct by a landlord.149 
However, the Quigley court and others have not explicitly required an 
adverse action for quid pro quo claims.150 In accordance with these cases, 
the text of the Rule does not require that an adverse action be taken after a 
request is made in order for a victim to state a quid pro quo claim. 
Further justification for this departure from Title VII case law comes 
from section 3604(c) of the FHA, “which adds to the prohibitions against 
statements indicating illegal preferences, limitations, and discrimination a 
ban on statements indicating ‘an intention to make any such preference, 
146. See, e.g., Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1089 (10th Cir. 1993).
147. Id. (quoting Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1414 (10th Cir. 1987)); see also
Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 947 (8th Cir. 2010). 
148. George, supra note 62, at 661–62; see, e.g., West v. DJ Mortg., LLC, 164 F. Supp. 3d 
1393, 1399 (N.D. Ga. 2016) (“Because the landlord deprived the tenant of certain benefits of the 
tenancy after she denied his sexual advances, her FHA quid pro quo sexual harassment claim survived 
summary judgment.”) (discussing Grieger v. Sheets, No. 87 C 6567, 1989 WL 38707, at *5 
(N.D.Ill.1989)). 
149. George, supra note 62, at 661–62 (internal citations omitted).
150. Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 947–48 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen Quigley inquired about
the likelihood of receiving her deposit back from Winter, Winter fluttered his hand against Quigley’s 
stomach and said, ‘My eagle eyes have not seen everything yet.’ The jury could reasonably infer 
Winter was telling Quigley the return of her deposit was conditioned upon Winter seeing more of 
Quigley’s body or even receiving a sexual favor, which would amount to ‘quid pro quo’ sexual 
harassment.”); United States v. Hurt, 676 F.3d 649, 654 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Several witnesses testified 
Bobby solicited sexual favors in exchange for housing or utilities, which, if believed, would constitute 
quid pro quo sexual harassment.”). 
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limitation, or discrimination’”—a phrase that Title VII does not include.151 
This prohibits statements expressing a landlord’s intent to violate the FHA, 
even if not acted on.152 “Thus, for example, where a landlord makes a 
statement threatening a tenant with eviction if she does not have sex with 
him but does not carry out this threat,” the landlord violates the FHA “even 
if traditional Title VII analysis would lead to the conclusion that he has 
not engaged in quid pro quo harassment.”153 Accordingly, the text of the 
FHA supports the Rule’s refusal to require an adverse action. 
This clarification is significant because it identifies the problematic 
conduct as solely the landlord’s. The Rule’s recognition that the landlord 
is culpable upon requesting certain favors shifts the focus away from the 
acts themselves, thereby combatting the impulse to view victims as willing 
participants in or partially responsible for sexual activity with the harasser. 
Placing culpability with landlords is proper given the common 
vulnerabilities of victims of sexual harassment in housing and the power 
differential between them and their landlords.154 Scholars have recognized 
that landlords—knowing the financial difficulties that most victims face—
consider their requests for sexual favors to be part of the negotiating 
practice surrounding their tenants’ housing.155 For example, Oliveri states 
that “what was contemplated by the landlords was not a ‘romantic 
relationship’ in any sense but a surprisingly straightforward commercial 
transaction—bartering sex for housing.”156 Such a transactional approach 
is one-sided and wrong. In fact, Balos argues that such behavior is likely 
criminal: “The solicitation by landlords of sex in exchange for rent is 
arguably soliciting illegal prostitution. However, once the behavior is 
labeled sexual harassment, the criminal nature of the act is concealed. By 
protecting the landlord’s private business dealings, the courts have . . . 
helped to disguise sexual violence.”157 The illegality of landlords’ requests 
for sex should not be masked. Oliveri adds that “[i]t is difficult to imagine 
our legal system tolerating any other setting in which purveyors of a 
151. Schwemm & Oliveri, supra note 49, at 806 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2020)). 
152. Id.
153. Id. at 808.
154. See supra Parts IV.C., IV.D.
155. Oliveri, supra note 41, at 623. See also Balos, supra note 34, at 87 (“The sexual
exploitation manifested itself as a market exchange for rent, in other words, he would take sex in the 
place of cash for rent. By renting to her without an agreement to lower the rent to an amount the tenant 
could afford, the landlord is making the exchange of sex for rent part of his entitlement as landlord.”) 
(discussing Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
156. Oliveri, supra note 41, at 623.
157. Balos, supra note 34, at 98.
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commercial good or service—medical care or food, for example—
routinely try to barter for sex. Yet this is the reality for a significant number 
of poor women” when attempting to secure housing.158 The Rule 
recognizes that the act of requesting sex in exchange for housing benefits 
is inherently wrong, regardless of how the victim responds to the coercive 
request. 
C. Hostile Environment Harassment
Turning to hostile environment claims, HUD’s definition of hostile 
environment discrimination borrows heavily from Title VII standards but 
also adopts language introduced specifically for the housing context. 
In subsection (a)(2), the Rule applies Title VII case law’s “sufficiently 
severe or pervasive” language to the FHA, but the Rule’s application of 
this standard differs from that imported without distinction from Title VII 
case law.159 The Honce court held that the FHA prohibits conduct that is 
“‘sufficiently severe or pervasive’ to alter the conditions of the housing 
arrangement” by “unreasonably interfer[ing] with use and enjoyment of 
the premises.”160 HUD’s Rule, on the other hand, states that 
[h]ostile environment harassment refers to unwelcome conduct that is
sufficiently severe or pervasive as to interfere with: The availability,
sale, rental, or use or enjoyment of a dwelling; the terms, conditions, or
privileges of the sale or rental, or the provision or enjoyment of services
or facilities in connection therewith; or the availability, terms, or
conditions of a residential real estate-related transaction.161
HUD arguably accepts a lower bar than the one set in Honce by not 
explicitly requiring that the harassment “alter the conditions of the housing 
arrangement.” This change is supported by the Housing Context Cases.162 
Furthermore, the Rule drops “unreasonably” from Honce’s interference 
condition, which may also be interpreted as accepting a lower bar of what 
158. Oliveri, supra note 41, at 634.
159. 24 C.F.R. § 100.600(a)(2) (2020); see Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 
67 (1986). 
160. Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1090 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 
F.2d 1406, 1413 (10th Cir. 1987)). 
161. 24 C.F.R. § 100.600(a)(2) (2020). 
162. See Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 946–47 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting the alteration
requirement but ruling that “there was sufficient evidence to support a hostile housing environment 
claim if a reasonable jury could find Quigley proved by a preponderance of the evidence Winter 
subjected her to unwelcome sexual harassment, and the harassment was sufficiently severe or 
pervasive so as to interfere with or deprive Quigley of her right to use or enjoy her home.”). 
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type of interference violates the FHA.163 This change is directly indicated 
by the text of the FHA as section 818 prohibits interference of protected 
rights without an unreasonableness qualifier.164 It is also supported by 
Housing Context Cases.165 Moreover, the Rule retains the “use or 
enjoyment” language from Honce—itself a departure from Title VII case 
law originating with section 818 of the FHA166—but takes a broader view 
than the Honce court about what is protected against interference. The 
language of what is protected comes from section 804 of the FHA, but the 
Rule adds “or enjoyment” to “of services or facilities in connection 
therewith.”167 This language clarifies, as not all courts have recognized, 
that what is statutorily protected from interference under the FHA extends 
beyond the dwelling to enjoyment of any facilities or services whose use 
is linked to the property.168 Together, these choices convey that what is 
affected need not be a feature central to the housing agreement but rather 
the plaintiff’s experience within the housing arrangement. 
This subsection also states that “[h]ostile environment harassment 
does not require a change in the economic benefits, terms, or conditions of 
the dwelling or housing-related services or facilities, or of the residential 
real-estate transaction.”169 This is in line with Title VII case law.170 
Notably, this section does not include any language indicating that 
harassment must subject persons of only one sex to offensive conditions 
to violate the FHA.171 Therefore, the Rule does not protect an “equal-
opportunity harasser.” This Title VII loophole was adopted in Honce172 
163. This may also appear to abandon the objectivity requirement derived from Title VII, but
the Rule addresses this standard in subsection (a)(2)(i)(C) (discussed below). 
164. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2020) (FHA § 818) (“It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten,
or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or 
enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment 
of, any right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.”). 
165.  Quigley, 598 F.3d at 946–47; Salisbury v. Hickman, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1290 (E.D. 
Cal. 2013) (“to prevail on a hostile housing environment claim a plaintiff must establish that she was 
subjected to (1) unwelcomed (2) sexual harassment that was (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive so as 
to interfere with or deprive the plaintiff of her right to use or enjoy her home.”). 
166. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2020) (FHA § 818). 
167. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2020) (FHA § 804(b)); 24 C.F.R. § 100.600(a)(2) (2020). 
168. For example, a rental may include access to a gym or an internet service—enjoyment of
these, not just provision of them, could be covered here. 
169. 24 C.F.R. § 100.600(a)(2) (2020). 
170. Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (“[T]he language of Title VII 
is not limited to ‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ discrimination.”). 
171. 24 C.F.R. § 100.600 (2020).
172. Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1090 (10th Cir. 1993) (“The landlord’s behavior here was
eccentric, and probably unwarranted, but was not directed solely at Ms. Honce. Other tenants of both 
sexes endured similar treatment. Because the conduct was neither sexual nor directed solely at women, 
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but had been rejected by some courts in both the Title VII and FHA 
settings since.173 Furthermore, HUD makes clear in its response to public 
comments that sex-based discrimination under the FHA includes 
harassment based on sexual orientation and gender identity, which 
contradicts the permissibility of the equal-opportunity harasser.174 Oliveri 
argues that, following Bostock, this interpretation of the FHA should be 
accepted by courts.175 She states that this would “be a welcome 
development for housing equity, considering the significant discrimination 
that gay, lesbian, and transgender individuals experience in housing and 
the dearth of legal protections in place for them.”176 
In subsection (a)(2)(i), the Rule adopts Title VII’s totality of the 
circumstances test for adjudicating the severe or pervasive standard.177 It 
includes factors derived from Title VII case law as well as factors tailored 
it is not actionable under the hostile housing environment theory.”). 
173. See, e.g., Miles, supra note 25, at 614 (“Other federal courts have rejected the defense
outright by replacing disparate treatment with an individual analysis of the ‘because of sex’ element.”). 
174. Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory 
Housing Practices Under the Fair Housing Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 63,054, 63,055 (Sept. 14, 2016) (codified 
as 24 C.F.R. § 100.600 (2020)). HUD traces a line of Title VII developments indicating this position. 
“HUD agrees with the commenters’ view that the Fair Housing Act’s prohibition on sex discrimination 
prohibits discrimination because of gender identity. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme 
Court interpreted Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination to encompass discrimination based on 
nonconformance with sex stereotypes, stating that ‘[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against 
individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate 
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.’ Taking note of Price Waterhouse and 
its progeny, in 2010, HUD issued a memorandum recognizing that sex discrimination prohibited by 
the Fair Housing Act includes discrimination because of gender identity. In 2012, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) reached the same conclusion, ‘clarifying that claims 
of discrimination based on transgender status, also referred to as claims of discrimination based on 
gender identity, are cognizable under Title VII’s sex discrimination prohibition.’ Following the 
EEOC’s decision, the Attorney General also concluded that: the best reading of Title VII’s prohibition 
of sex discrimination is that it encompasses discrimination based on gender identity, including 
transgender status. . . . HUD reaffirms its view that under the Fair Housing Act, discrimination based 
on gender identity is sex discrimination. Accordingly, quid pro quo or hostile environment harassment 
in housing because of a person’s gender identity is indistinguishable from harassment because of sex. 
HUD, in its 2010 memorandum, also advised that claims of housing discrimination because of sexual 
orientation can be investigated under the Price Waterhouse sex-stereotyping theory. Over the past two 
decades, an increasing number of Federal courts, building on the Price Waterhouse rationale, have 
found protections under Title VII for those asserting discrimination claims related to their sexual 
orientation.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
175. Rigel C. Oliveri, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Discrimination Under the Fair
Housing Act After Bostock v. Clayton County, 69 KANS. L. REV. 1 (forthcoming Feb. 2021) (“This is 
an obvious next step given the similar language, structure, and purpose of both statutes, and the courts’ 
long tendency to use Title VII cases to guide their interpretation of the FHA.”). 
176. Id.
177. 24 C.F.R. § 100.600(a)(2)(i) (2020) (“Whether hostile environment harassment exists
depends upon the totality of the circumstances.”); see supra Part II for discussion of the totality of the 
circumstances test. 
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to FHA claims.178 The factors that the Rule borrows from Title VII case 
law include the nature, context, severity, scope, frequency, and duration 
of the conduct.179 The Rule provides two additional factors to be 
considered: the “location of the conduct, and the relationships of the 
persons involved.”180 In the Housing Context Cases, courts have 
considered both the location of the harm and the landlord-tenant 
relationship in evaluating the harassment.181 While these factors have been 
considered in determining liability within the employment context,182 they 
are not included in the totality of the circumstances test under Title VII.183 
This change is certainly a step toward demanding consideration of the 
unique context of harassment in housing, but the question is whether HUD 
went far enough. 
On the one hand, these two factors give courts room to consider the 
particular harm of harassment occurring within the home and/or by a 
landlord. It is significant that these factors are included in the totality of 
the circumstances test as opposed to being merely acknowledged in the 
factual background section. This invites courts to discuss the sanctity of 
the home, privacy rights within the home, evidence relating to the special 
power a landlord has over a vulnerable victim, and other aspects unique to 
harassment under the FHA in weighing a claim. Accordingly, a court is 
178. Id.
179. Id.; see, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67; Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). 
“Duration” first considered in federal appellate courts in Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 112 
F.3d 710, 715 (3d Cir. 1997). 
180. 24 C.F.R. § 100.600(a)(2)(i)(A) (2020). 
181. See Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 
938 (8th Cir. 2010). 
182. For example, location is considered in whether the conduct falls within the scope of
employment. See, e.g., Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2001) (rape of female 
flight attendant by male co-worker in hotel was within the work environment because the hotel stay 
was reserved by the airline for the flight crew between assigned flights). The relationship between the 
parties is used to determine whether the employer will be (1) strictly liable (i.e., supervisor took 
tangible employment action), (2) subject to the Faragher-Ellerth defense (i.e., not-tangible action by 
supervisor), or (3) based on negligence (i.e., harassment by co-workers). 
183. However, these factors have been included by the District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia in a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress: “the undersigned distills three 
general principles for analyzing intentional infliction of emotional distress claims premised on sexual 
harassment. First, courts must examine the totality of the circumstances in evaluating such a claim. 
Second, the following factors are relevant in evaluating whether the conduct is extreme or outrageous: 
(1) the pervasiveness of the conduct; (2) the relationship between the harasser and the plaintiff (i.e.,
prior romantic relationship, supervisory relationship); (3) the severity of the conduct; (4) the frequency
of the conduct; (5) the amount, duration, and length of physical contact; (6) the location of the 
conduct (i.e., in public or in private); and (7) the physically threatening nature of the conduct.” Long-
Hall v. U.S. Ready Mix, No. 1:08-CV-1546-CAP-AJB, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149796, at *117–18
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 2, 2010) (internal citations omitted). 
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free to find that these considerations help a victim meet the “severe or 
pervasive” standard, including placing particular weight on them within 
the totality of the circumstances test. 
On the other hand, the Rule does not indicate that courts need to 
consider such points and does not give the newly identified factors any 
particular weight. Courts may consider the location and relationships in a 
given situation without acknowledging any added harm in harassment that 
happens at home or by a landlord. In other words, HUD succeeded in 
bringing these factors into the analysis but fell short of explicitly 
identifying the unique level of harm attached to them. For example, the 
Rule does not state that harassment at home is or can be inherently more 
severe than similar conduct at work. The Background section recognizes 
this, but such language is omitted from the text of the Rule itself and 
therefore its power is diminished.184 Specifically, courts need not, in 
discussing these factors, consider privacy rights, jurisprudence on the 
sanctity of the home, information about special vulnerabilities of tenants 
and likely victims, or other concepts or data that may indicate heightened 
egregiousness of harassment in housing compared to the employment 
context. Accordingly, it is not clear from the Rule if harassment in housing 
needs to be any less egregious to qualify as “severe or pervasive” under 
the FHA than under Title VII. By failing to address the unique harm of 
harassment at home in the Rule’s text, HUD did not provide needed 
guidance on weighing or analyzing the added factors. 
During the Rule’s public comment period, commenters requested that 
HUD explicitly incorporate the unique nature of harassment in housing 
into the totality of the circumstances test.185 Commenters asked that the 
Rule state as an additional factor in (a)(2)(i)(A) “the heightened rights in 
or around one’s home for privacy and freedom from harassment” or, 
alternatively, “the heightened reasonable expectation of privacy and 
freedom from harassment in one’s home.”186 Another commenter 
requested that this subsection “expressly state that conduct occurring in 
one’s home may result in a violation of the Fair Housing Act even though 
184. Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory 
Housing Practices Under the Fair Housing Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 63,054, 63,055 (Sept. 14, 2016) (codified 
as 24 C.F.R. § 100.600 (2020)). The Background section is included in the Federal Register but not 
in the Code of Federal Regulations, which limits its visibility and power. 
185. Id. at 63,063.
186. Id.
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the same conduct in one’s place of employment may not violate Title 
VII.”187 HUD responded: 
HUD declines to add language regarding individuals’ heightened rights 
within the home for privacy and freedom from unwelcome speech and 
conduct to the rule text in § 100.600(a)(2)(i)(A). The non-exhaustive list 
of factors included in § 100.600(a)(2)(i)(A) identifies circumstances that 
can be demonstrated with evidence during the adjudication of a claim of 
hostile environment harassment under the Act. Evidence regarding the 
“location of the conduct,” as explicitly identified in 
§ 100.600(a)(2)(i)(A), is a critical factor for consideration and will allow
courts to take into account the heightened privacy and other rights that
exist within the home when determining whether hostile environment
harassment occurred. For similar reasons, HUD also declines to add
language stating that harassing conduct may result in a violation of the
Fair Housing Act even though such conduct might not violate Title VII.
HUD believes that by establishing a hostile environment harassment
standard tailored to the specific rights protected by the Fair Housing Act
and by directing that hostile environment claims under the Act are to be
evaluated by assessing the totality of the circumstances—including the
location of the unwelcome conduct and the context in which it
occurred—the final rule ensures that courts consider factors unique to
the housing context when making the fact-specific determination of
whether the particular conduct at issue violates the Act. Therefore, while
HUD agrees that unwelcome conduct in or around the home can be
particularly intrusive and threatening and may violate the Fair Housing
Act even though the same or similar conduct in an employment setting
may not violate Title VII, HUD does not believe the proposed additions
to § 100.600(a)(2)(i)(A) are necessary.188
HUD is wrong here. The divergence between cases applying the Title VII 
standard strictly and the Housing Context Cases indicates that the 
proposed additions are necessary—or would at least be very helpful—in 
providing clarity to courts. Since cases like DiCenso and Honce are still 
valid, they will likely continue to be used to maintain an inappropriately 
high bar for recoverability, blocking many victims from recovering based 
on the Title VII standard. HUD is correct that the language of 
§ 100.600(a)(2)(i)(A) “will allow courts to take into account the
heightened privacy and other rights” of the home, but the failure to
explicitly acknowledge the distinctiveness of harassment in housing in the
text of the Rule fails to “ensure[ ] that courts consider factors unique to the
187. Id.
188. Id.
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housing context.”189 HUD has left it to courts to decide whether the 
location and relationships involved in harassment at home render the 
harassment any more severe than those in an employment, and courts will 
likely continue to disagree on this point. 
In subsection (a)(2)(i)(B), the Rule explicitly states that psychological 
harm is unnecessary to state a claim.190 As mentioned, this point was 
clarified by the Supreme Court in the employment context.191 Claimants 
under the FHA have largely avoided misguided demands for extreme 
psychological damage for a claim to be actionable.192 
In subsection (a)(2)(i)(C), the Rule specifies that the severe or 
pervasive standard is evaluated “from the perspective of a reasonable 
person in the aggrieved person’s position.”193 This is a shift from Title VII 
case law’s standard of what “a reasonable person would find hostile or 
abusive,”194 which was adopted in DiCenso.195 The “reasonable person in 
the aggrieved person’s position” standard isn’t as specific as the Ninth 
Circuit’s “reasonable woman” standard196 in recognizing that women 
frequently experience harassment and may interpret such treatment 
differently than men. However, it provides space for courts to consider 
common vulnerabilities of victims, including those beyond gender. The 
Rule can be read as considering either the viewpoint of each victim or the 
perspective of a low-income woman who exhibits characteristics of 
vulnerability common to victims under the FHA. Since many victims share 
characteristics of gender, economic vulnerability, status as head of 
household, and sometimes race, it is appropriate for courts to consider the 
perspective of a person in these circumstances. This may shift the analysis 
away from the image of a deviant landlord with sexual interest in a 
particular tenant to one of a landlord strategically preying on specific 
victims based on their vulnerabilities and the power differential between 
the parties. This interpretation allows courts to challenge the “dirty old 
man” narrative and give greater consideration to the systemic forces 
189. Id.
190. 24 C.F.R. § 100.600(a)(2)(i)(B) (2020). 
191. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993) (resolving circuit split on the requisite 
psychological harm, with some circuits, such as the Sixth Circuit in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 
805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986), requiring the conduct to seriously affect the victim’s psychological 
well-being). 
192. See, e.g., Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085 (10th Cir. 1993).
193. 24 C.F.R. § 100.600(a)(2)(i)(C) (2020). 
194. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
195. DiCenso v. Cisneros, F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1996).
196. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879–80 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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driving vulnerability to sexual harassment, particularly for women of 
color.197 
Finally, in subsection (a)(2)(ii), HUD clarifies that the Faragher-
Ellerth defense is not available under the FHA.198 This is in line with the 
few courts that have considered this issue.199 This departure from the Title 
VII standard is certainly positive for victims. As mentioned, scholars have 
long critiqued the affirmative defense under Title VII as a back door for 
employers to escape liability.200 HUD is right to acknowledge that housing 
providers should not be granted a similar back door as significant 
functional differences between the two settings render the affirmative 
defense inappropriate under the FHA.201 
Ultimately, HUD’s Rule resolves questions about the fit of Title VII 
case law in the FHA context in some respects but not others. While the 
Rule utilizes the Title VII framework that has been incorporated into FHA 
case law, it also includes language promoting consideration of features of 
harassment unique to housing, as supported by the Housing Context Cases. 
Still, it does not go far enough in guiding courts to consider the special 
nature of the home when evaluating harassment occurring there. The Rule 
offers some benefits to victims, but it fails to fully account for the unique 
harms attached to harassment in housing. 
VII. Case Law Since HUD ’s 2016 Rule
24 CFR § 100.600 went into effect on October 16, 2016. Since then, 
federal courts have infrequently cited the Rule and even less frequently 
applied the Rule in determining whether harassment qualifies for recovery 
under the FHA. This section analyzes relevant federal cases discussing 
sexual harassment under the FHA since HUD’s Rule.202 From these cases 
197. Elengold, supra note 35, at 229.
198. 24 C.F.R. § 100.600(a)(2)(ii) (2020). 
199. Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC, 901 F.3d 856, 863 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(“Because the text of the FHA does not spell out a test for landlord liability, we look to analogous anti-
discrimination statutes for guidance. One natural point of reference is Title VII . . . We recognize, 
however, that there are some potentially important differences between the relationship that exists 
between an employer and an employee, in which one is the agent of the other, and that between a 
landlord and a tenant, in which the tenant is largely independent of the landlord. We thus refrain from 
reflexively adopting the Title VII standard and continue our search for comparable situations.”); 
Richards v. Bono, No. 5:04-cv-484-Oc-10GRJ, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43585, at *31 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 
26, 2005) (“The Court has found no cases applying Faragher to a Title VIII action 
for sexual harassment.”). 
200. See supra Part II.
201. Id.
202. Cases focusing on liability issues stemming from harassment perpetrated by someone
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it is clear that the Rule has been underutilized by courts to distinguish FHA 
claims from those brought under Title VII.203 
In West v. DJ Mortgage, LLC, the District Court for the Northern 
District of Georgia referenced the Rule in recognizing a sexual harassment 
claim under the FHA and in addressing vicarious liability, including noting 
the Rule’s rejection of the affirmative defense.204 But in evaluating 
whether the plaintiff had presented a valid question for the jury on whether 
the actions against her were sufficiently severe or pervasive, the court did 
not mention the Rule. Still, the court reasoned that one incident of the 
property/leasing manager grabbing the plaintiff’s vagina could be 
independently severe enough to present the question to the jury (though 
the manager also made multiple requests for nude pictures and other sexual 
advances).205 The court did consider the setting of the harassment, stating 
that “[a] reasonable jury could conclude that these interactions—
particularly in the intimate context of Ms. West’s home and security, as 
opposed to her place of employment—went beyond ‘[s]imple teasing, 
other than the property owner are generally excluded from this discussion. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Glen 
St. Andrew Living Cmty., LLC, 901 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2018); G.B. v. Dipace, No. 1:14-CV-0500 
(DNH/CFH), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51459 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2019). Another noteworthy issue 
falling beyond this discussion is the Second Circuit’s decision in Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., 
which cites a regulation HUD issued in 1989 to support a holding that post-acquisition claims apply 
under sections 3604 and 3617, but it did not consider the Rule in reaching this conclusion. 944 F.3d 
370, 375–78 (2d Cir. 2019); see supra notes 61, 131. The dissent does mention the Rule in a footnote, 
but only in discussing liability issues under 24 C.F.R. § 100.7(a)(1). Id. at 378 n.7 (Livingston, J., 
dissenting). Judge Livingston argues that section 100.7(a)(1) “deserves no deference because it 
misinterprets the FHA’s text, finds no support in precedent, and relies on a flawed analogy to Title 
VII.” Id. at 394 (Livingston, D., dissenting). 
203. It is worth noting that the Rule was issued soon before the presidential election of 2016 
and that the Trump Administration clearly expressed its disfavor of regulations. See, e.g., Charles S. 
Clark, The Trump Administration’s War on Regulations, GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE, 
https://www.govexec.com/feature/trump-administrations-war-regulations/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2020); 
Keith B. Belton & John D. Graham, Deregulation Under Trump, REGULATION, Summer 2020, at 14, 
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2020-06/regulation-v43n2-5.pdf. This may have impacted 
parties’ and courts’ reluctance to rely on the Rule. This reluctance may decrease under future 
administrations, though Trump’s appointees to the Supreme Court may influence the Court’s future 
decisions on the subject. See Tim Ryan & Alexandra Ellerbeck, Trump Appointees Vocal at Hearing 
on Agency Deference, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (Mar. 27, 2019), 
https://www.courthousenews.com/trump-appointees-vocal-at-hearing-on-agency-deference/; Dino 
Grandoni, The Energy 202: How Amy Coney Barrett may make it harder for environmentalists to win 
in court, WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 28, 2020, 6:20 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/28/energy-202-how-amy-coney-barrett-may-
make-it-harder-environmentalists-win-court/. But see Davis Wright Tremaine, Trump Track: Chevron 
Deference Thrives?, JD SUPRA (July 26, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/trump-track-
chevron-deference-thrives-25186/ (“[It] would appear that deference to the administrative state is 
firmly implanted in our judicial system, no matter the ideology of the Administration in office.”). 
204. West v. DJ Mortg., LLC, 271 F. Supp. 3d 1336, 1351, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
205. Id. at 1352–55.
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offhand comments, and isolated incidents that are viewed only as annoying 
or offensive.’”206 But in reaching its decision, the court stated that “the 
conduct must be ‘serious, persistent, and explicitly humiliating or 
threatening conduct.’”207 Requiring “explicitly humiliating or threatening 
conduct” is not in line with the Rule. 
In Godwin v. Senior Garden Apartments, the District Court for the 
District of Nevada laid out the standard for actionability for sexual 
harassment under the FHA but did not mention HUD’s Rule.208 The court 
found that the plaintiff’s allegations of “repeated, unwanted sexual 
invitations, suggestions, and demands, and that her refusal to accede led 
to her eviction” sufficiently stated a claim under the FHA.209 
In Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center v. Kelly, the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana referred to the Rule to 
verify that a claim of sexual harassment is actionable under the FHA but 
did not use the Rule to identify the legal framework for evaluating such 
claims.210 The court’s application of the severe or pervasive standard relied 
heavily on DiCenso and Honce, including citing DiCenso to support that 
“one discrete instance of harassment [is] not sufficient to create a hostile 
housing environment,” in direct opposition to the Rule.211 The court found 
that the plaintiff stated a valid claim in asserting that the landlord grabbed 
her buttocks, made suggestive remarks, and “‘peered into [her] apartment 
windows when she was home and repeatedly entered her apartment 
without warning and without her consent,’ including once while she was 
in the shower.”212 The court analogized the case to Quigley and also 
considered evidence that the landlord engaged in similar behavior with 
other female tenants.213 While this touches on the Rule’s factors of 
relationships and location, the court did not directly invoke these or 
specifically weigh them in making its decision. 
206. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Butler v. Carrero, No. 1:12-cv-2743-WSD, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 130838, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Sep. 12, 2013)). 
207. Id. at *21 (quoting Tagliaferri v. Winter Park Hous. Auth., 486 Fed. Appx. 771, 774 (11th
Cir. 2012)). 
208. Godwin v. Senior Garden Apartments, No. 2:17-cv-02178-MMD-CWH, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 38738, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 9, 2018). 
209. Id. at *5.
210. Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. Kelly, 364 F. Supp. 3d 635, 651 (E.D. La.
2019). 
211. Id. at 652.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 652–53.
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In Mohamed v. McLaurin, the District Court for the District of 
Vermont analyzed a hostile environment FHA claim without invoking the 
Rule.214 The court stated that “[i]solated or sporadic sexually inappropriate 
acts are not sufficiently pervasive and severe to constitute sexual 
harassment under the FHA.”215 While the court ultimately rejected the 
claim based on issues with the plaintiff’s credibility,216 the court ended its 
analysis of this issue in a very problematic way. It indicated that even if 
the plaintiff had met the severe or pervasive standard, she “cannot further 
establish that she left the apartment within a reasonable period of time after 
her housing conditions became intolerable.”217 This is both an incorrect 
and a dangerous interpretation of FHA sexual harassment law because 
constructive eviction is not required under a hostile environment claim and 
far surpasses what is required to show interference with use or enjoyment 
of the property. This approach hearkens back to Title VII cases like Wyly 
v. W.F.K.R., Inc., where a waitress’s supervisor repeatedly spoke crudely
to her, placed his hand down her pants against her protests, and grabbed
her throat saying he wanted to have sex with her, yet the court ruled that
the victim did not have a subjective belief about the hostility of the
environment.218 The court based this finding on the fact that the waitress
“testified her job ‘was a really enjoyable shift,’ and outside of [the
supervisor], her coworkers ‘were good to [her]’” and that she “continued
to work at Sugar’s for roughly four months after [the supervisor] touched
her.”219 This approach, essentially demanding constructive discharge for a
hostile environment claim, was misguided in the employment context as
victims should not be punished for trying to retain their jobs when
214. Mohamed v. McLaurin, 390 F. Supp. 3d 520, 548–52 (D. Vt. 2019). The court did state 
that “[a] federal regulation, promulgated under the FHA, recognizes that § 3617 prohibits 
‘[t]hreatening, intimidating or interfering with persons in their enjoyment of a dwelling because of the 
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin of such persons, or of visitors or 
associates of such persons.’” 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (emphasis supplied). In light of the broad 
remedial purposes of the FHA, the court predicts that the Second Circuit would likewise recognize a 
post-acquisition hostile housing environment claim under either § 3604 or § 3617.” Mohamed, 390 F. 
Supp. 3d at 547. 
215. Id. at 549 (quoting Rich v. Lubin, No. 02 Civ. 6786 (TPG), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9091,
at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2004); citing Shellhammer v. Lewallen, No. 84-3573, 1985 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 14205, at *4 (6th Cir. July 31, 1985) (“[Plaintiff] points to two sexual requests during the three 
or four months of her tenancy. This does not amount to the pervasive and persistent conduct which is 
a predicate to finding that the sexual harassment created a burdensome situation.”)). Note that 
“pervasive and severe” is not the correct standard. 
216. Id. at 552.
217. Id.
218. Wyly v. W.F.K.R., Inc., 1 F. Supp. 3d 510, 512 (W.D. Tex. 2014). 
219. Id. at 515 (second alteration in original). 
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subjected to harassment. It is even more out of place in the housing 
context, where the alternative is often homelessness.220 In fact, the 
Mohamed plaintiff was especially vulnerable as a Somali refugee with 
eight children, limited English abilities, and a low-income job.221 This 
approach certainly has no support in HUD’s Rule, and it is concerning that 
even after the Rule’s issuance courts are pushing the standard for recovery 
to such heights. 
In Noah v. Assor, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
quoted the Rule and held that the plaintiff presented sufficient facts for an 
actionable claim under either quid pro quo or hostile environment 
standards.222 For the quid pro quo claim, the defendant followed through 
on threats to not renew the plaintiff’s lease or return her security deposit if 
she did not have a sexual relationship with him.223 For the hostile 
environment claim, the court considered repeated instances of stalking, 
physical trespasses, sexual propositions, lewd comments, and expressions 
of jealousy.224 The court also considered the landlord-tenant relationship 
in “find[ing] these stalking allegations particularly important.”225 The 
court further stated that the plaintiff not alleging physical touch or harm 
“or [threat of] touch or harm . . . does not bar her Fair Housing Act claim, 
because the statutory structure, regulations promulgated by [HUD], and 
interpretive case law are in accord that unlawful interference under the 
220. Howell, supra note 86, at 17 (“So long as courts treat housing harassment like workplace 
harassment, landlords can sexually harass indigent and near-indigent women without real fear of court 
intervention. A female tenant will remain caught between two evils. She must either accept sexual 
harassment, sexually transmitted diseases, and possible pregnancy or face living on the mean streets 
of America.”). 
221. Mohamed v. McLaurin, 390 F. Supp. 3d 520, 527 (D. Vt. 2019).
222. Noah v. Assor, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1290 (S.D. Fla. 2019). The court also stated that
“district courts in the Eleventh Circuit agree that Section 3617 ‘extends only to discriminatory conduct 
that is so severe or pervasive that it will have the effect of causing a protected person to abandon the 
exercise of his or her housing rights.’” Id. at 1289–90 (quoting Lawrence v. Courtyards at Deerwood 
Ass’n, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d, 1133, 1144 (S.D. Fla. 2004)). While § 100.600(a) does not state that it 
applies to § 3617, this abandonment of housing rights goes well beyond the harm required by § 
100.600. 
223. Id. at 1290–91.
224. Id. at 1291–93.
225. Id. at 1292–93 (citing Salisbury v. Hickman, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1293 (E.D. Cal.
2013) (denying summary judgment to defendants and noting that “sexual harassment by someone in 
a position of authority is more likely to be emotionally and psychologically threatening,” such as where 
the defendant “on-site manager . . . is first in-line to respond to any issue that might interfere with 
[plaintiff’s] use and enjoyment of her residence”); Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393, 1398 (C.D. 
Cal 1995) (denying motion to dismiss hostile environment sexual harassment claim under Fair 
Housing Act and emphasizing harassment came from resident manager, “whose very role was to 
provide [a] safe environment”)). 
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Fair Housing Act does not require force, or threat of force.”226 This 
analysis provides a useful example of how courts should apply HUD’s 
Rule. 
In Cudjoe v. Watermark Villas at Quail North, LLC, the District Court 
for the Western District of Oklahoma cited the Rule to identify both quid 
pro quo and hostile environment claims as causes of action under the FHA 
and to define hostile environment harassment in denying a motion to 
dismiss.227 The court did not analyze the Rule further. 
In Birdo v. Duluky, the District Court for the District of Minnesota 
determined that the plaintiff “failed to plausibly allege a sexual-
harassment claim under the FHA” for discrimination he believed was due 
to his unwillingness to participate in homosexual behavior, but the court 
did not consider the Rule.228 The court stated that the plaintiff’s complaint 
did “not allege that anyone explicitly conditioned any housing benefits to 
Birdo on any sort of sexual favors.”229 The court’s requirement of 
explicitly conditioning housing benefits on sexual acts contradicts the 
Rule, as well as the Eighth Circuit’s precedent, which is controlling and to 
which the court cited.230 In considering whether the alleged behavior 
created a hostile environment, the court stated that it had “little difficulty 
concluding that this conduct is not ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive.’”231 
In a footnote, the court stated that this conclusion was 
particularly clear when considering Eighth Circuit cases concerning Title 
VII sexual-harassment claims, which rely on a similar sufficiently-
severe-or-pervasive standard. See, e.g., . . . E.E.O.C. v. CRST Van 
Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 687 (8th Cir. 2012) (affirming summary-
judgment grant for defendants in Title VII sexual-harassment claim 
where relevant conduct included “complaints about [Defendants’ 
employees’] poor personal hygiene, boasting about past sexual exploits, 
sporadic remarks of sexual vulgarity, and highly offensive but isolated 
instances of propositioning for sex”).232 
226. Id. at 1293 (footnotes omitted). 
227. Cudjoe v. Watermark Villas at Quail N., LLC, No. CIV-17-1068-D, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 41538, at *7–9 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 14, 2019). 
228. Birdo v. Duluky, No. 20-CV-1108 (SRN/HB), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170242, at *10 (D. 
Minn. Aug. 27, 2020). 
229. Id. at *9–10.
230.  Id. (citing United States v. Hurt, 676 F.3d 649, 654 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Quid pro quo sexual 
harassment occurs when housing benefits are explicitly or implicitly conditioned on sexual favors.”) 
(quoting Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 946–47 (8th Cir. 2010))). 
231. Id. at *10.
232. Id. at note 3.
80] FHA Sexual Harassment Claims 
125 
This exclusive reliance on Title VII case law in applying the severe or 
pervasive standard is concerning because it sets a high bar and leaves little 
room for distinguishing the contexts or harms of harassment under the two 
statutes. 
In Torres v. Puntney, the District Court for the District of Nevada 
refuted the defendant’s assertion that the plaintiff failed to state a claim, 
stating that “it is beyond question that sexual harassment is a form of 
discrimination.”233 The court cited the Rule in recognizing both quid pro 
quo and hostile environment sexual harassment and concluding that 
“allegations that [the defendant] demanded a sexual favor and a sexual 
consent form are sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief under either 
theory.”234 
In United States v. Webb, the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Missouri denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss an FHA sexual 
harassment suit alleging: 
(1) [the owner-landlord] demands to know personal information about
[the tenant] such as whether she had a boyfriend, how she engaged in sex
with her girlfriend, whether she and her girlfriend would engage in a
threesome, and whether they would engage in a threesome with [the
owner-landlord]; (2) sexual comments about [the tenant’s] body; (3)
offers of housing benefits like free or reduced rent in exchange for sex;
(4) a request or attempt to touch [the tenant’s] breasts; and (5) [The
owner-landlord’s] watching [the tenant] and her guests from outside her
home for no legitimate business reason.235
In denying this motion, the court responded to the defendants’ argument 
that the allegations “plead nothing more than the ordinary tribulations of 
apartment living, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-
related jokes, and occasional teasing.”236 The court stated that “[i]t is true 
that Title VII does not prescribe a general civility code nor does it prohibit 
genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and women routinely 
interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite sex” but decided 
that the plaintiff’s complaint alleged “more than ‘ordinary tribulations of 
apartment living.’”237 The court’s decision rightly recognized that the 
233. Torres v. Puntney, No. 2:19-cv-00594-APG-EJY, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88470, at *6 (D. 
Nev. May 20, 2020); see also Torres v. Rothstein, No. 2:19-CV-00594-APG-EJY, 2020 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 53218 (D. Nev. Mar. 24, 2020). 
234. Torres, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88470, at *6.
235. United States v. Webb, No. 4:16cv1400 SNLJ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21940, at *1–2 
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 16, 2017). 
236. Id. at *5.
237. Id. at *5–7 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 777–78 
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alleged harassment may be severe and pervasive, but its extension of Title 
VII’s “general civility code” precedent to the housing context is 
problematic given the differences discussed in Part IV. If courts are willing 
to accept “ordinary tribulations of [rental] living” as outside the purview 
of the FHA and these “ordinary tribulations” include sexual harassment by 
a landlord, the FHA will not be able to adequately protect victims against 
sexual harassment. 
From these cases it is clear that HUD’s Rule has seen limited 
application by courts so far. This is problematic because some courts 
continue to evaluate sexual harassment without considering the 
uniqueness of sexual harassment in the housing setting, applying ill-fitting 
standards that bar some victims from recovery. 
Courts’ relative indifference to the Rule runs counter to the principles 
of agency law espoused in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council.238 As the Sixth Circuit noted before the Rule was issued, 
“we defer to Department of Housing and Urban Development regulations 
to the extent they are ‘a permissible construction of the statute.’”239 The 
Rule is “a permissible construction of the statute” based on the text of the 
FHA and the holdings and reasoning of the Housing Context Cases 
recognizing that significant differences between harassment under the 
Title VII and the FHA warrant standards tailored to the FHA. Therefore, 
courts should give the Rule deference. Instead, some courts continue to 
look to precedent developed before its passage and apply standards 
imported from Title VII case law without considering the housing setting. 
VIII. Conclusion
While the Title VII framework may have been a good starting point 
for courts to evaluate sexual harassment claims under the FHA, Title VII 
standards are not a perfect fit for harassment in the housing context. 
(1998) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998))) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
238. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 
(1984). 
239. Campbell v. Robb, 162 Fed. Appx. 460, 466 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. 
at 842–44); see also Bailey, supra note 61, at 234 (“Throughout FHA jurisprudence, the federal courts 
have relied on ‘four guiding principles’ for interpreting the FHA, two of which are that the FHA should 
be construed broadly and that Title VII gives essential guidance in construing the statute. The 
remaining two principles are that the statute should be interpreted with reference to the congressional 
goal of racial integration in housing and that interpretations and regulations promulgated by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) are entitled to significant weight and 
deference.”) 
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Although HUD’s Rule does not go far enough in delineating where the 
lines between Title VII and FHA standards should be drawn, it does 
provide some tailoring to harassment in the housing context. It certainly 
provides room for courts to consider the uniqueness of the housing setting 
in their application of the framework borrowed from Title VII. But courts 
are not displaying sufficient deference to the Rule, and some courts 
continue to perpetuate dangerous ideas about what violates the FHA. 
Moving forward, courts should apply HUD’s Rule broadly. Even if they 
do not, courts should integrate reasoning such as that in the Housing 
Context Cases, acknowledging and considering the harms and features 
unique to harassment in the housing context. This approach will allow the 
FHA to offer appropriate redress to tenants who are sexually harassed in 
the place intended to be a sanctuary. 
